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INTRODUCTION: THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE AND HUMAN MIGRATION
Since before the dawn of recorded history, human civilizations have
been built, destroyed, and reshaped by the ceaseless movement of peoples
from one place to another over the course of decades and centuries. Like
the advance and retreat of glaciers, and the clash of tectonic plates, the
human urge to migrate is a force that civilizations may hope to understand
and partially mitigate, but can never abolish or control.
The United States as a nation owes its existence to the inexorability of
this urge. Five hundred years of forced and voluntary migration have made
this country what it is. The American law of immigration can best be
viewed as a partial response to the implacable pressure of migration.
American immigration laws are not aimed at, and only very remotely
shape, this long-term historical force. Constitutional and legal norms may
influence how migration affects our society in the present, but they do not
create the force of migration and, no matter how altered, cannot abolish it.
To focus immigration policy on somehow doing away with migration is
likely to prove as futile as would be a climate policy based on outlawing
the retreat of the Arctic icecap.
Nonetheless, current policy debate on immigration is influenced by the
illusion that we can somehow defuse the surge of immigration. So it
should hardly be surprising that at a time like this, we are experiencing an
upsurge of interest in the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which is the central engine of the legal assimilation of new immigrant
populations into the United States.
Because of the Citizenship Clause, ―all persons born . . . in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof‖ are American citizens. In the
case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark,1 the United States Supreme Court
held that this guarantee applies to children of foreigners present on
American soil, even if their parents are not American citizens and indeed
are not eligible to become U.S. citizens.2 The Court has not re-examined
1. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
2. Id. at 705.
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this issue since the concept of ―illegal alien‖ entered the language,3 but as a
practical matter, the American-born children receive recognition of their
citizenship regardless of the immigration status of their parents.4
As a matter of text, this result is straightforward. A child of illegal
aliens, if ―born‖ in the United States, is in a commonsense way surely at
the moment of birth ―subject to the jurisdiction‖ of the United States. Any
power the law has over children of American citizens at the moment of
their birth on American soil, it also has over American-born children of
aliens, regardless of the parents‘ immigration status. Such a child may be,
for example, taken into custody as part of a child abuse investigation,
detained indefinitely, placed in foster care, and made adoptable by an
appropriate action to strip her parents of parental rights.5 Any assets
belonging to her, if made subject the subject of a civil dispute, are subject
to attachment by the courts under the proper circumstances. The criminal
justice system has as much access to her as it does to any child of citizen
parents.
This seemingly straightforward application of constitutional text is now
under attack.
One strand of the attack arises out of simple
(and, it must be said, ugly) nativist anger at the impact of immigrants, legal
or otherwise, on society. In August 2006, the television news commentator
Lou Dobbs ―polled‖ the viewers of his Cable News Network show with the
following question: ―Do you believe illegal aliens who have anchor babies
in the United States should be immune from deportation?‖6 Ninety-three
percent of those responding, he reported, voted ―no.‖7 Recently, Senator
3. The term ―illegal alien‖ pops up in the federal reports in 1950. See Waisbord v.
United States, 183 F.2d 34, 35 (5th Cir. 1950). ―Illegal immigrant‖ first appears in United
States caselaw in 1954, but in a context that refers to British attempts to stop the flow of
Jewish refugees to Palestine. Derecktor v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 136, 139 (Ct. Cl.
1954). As a term from United States immigration law, it enters the caselaw in 1957, when
the Ninth Circuit considered an appeal by a defendant of his conviction for assaulting an
immigration officer who, having been informed that illegal entrants from Mexico were
present in a Pico, California, bar, had entered the bar and begun asking customers for their
place
of
birth.
Amaya
v.
United
States,
247 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1957). The court stated that ―[s]triving to stem the swelling tide
of ‗wetbacks‘—illegal immigrants from Mexico—that is sweeping into the United States,
for years American immigration authorities have progressively tightened their vigilance
over the ramparts they watch.‖ Id. at 947.
4. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006) (codifying birthright citizenship in the United States).
5. See In re Adoption of Peggy, 767 N.E.2d 29, 32, 35–36 (Mass. 2002) (holding that
the immigration status of a child has no effect on the authority of the state‘s child protection
agency to exercise jurisdiction over the child); S. Adam Ferguson, Not Without My
Daughter:
Deportation
and
the
Termination
of
Parental
Rights,
22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85, 89 (2007) (―Federal immigration law specifically recognizes state
jurisdiction over custody determinations of children who have been abused or neglected,
regardless of the child‘s immigration status.‖).
6. Ken Auletta, Mad As Hell, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 4, 2006, at 72.
7. Id. Note the intricate manipulativeness of the question. To begin with, it implies
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Lindsey Graham denounced aliens who, like livestock, ―come here to drop
a child. It‘s called ‗drop and leave.‘‖8
But, another strand is far more respectable intellectually. This is a legal
argument that the interpretation of the Citizenship Clause as covering the
children of ―illegal‖ immigrants is inconsistent with the ―original intent‖ of
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim is obviously of vast
practical consequence. If the Clause is not peremptory in its meaning, then
Congress could vote to withhold citizenship from native-born children
based on their parents‘ immigration status—which, if upheld by the courts,
would quickly produce a large population of native non-citizens (possibly
stateless as well) within our borders.9
Beyond that practical importance, however, the argument is
an interesting opportunity to review the nature of ―originalism‖
as a method of constitutional interpretation. Originalism is often advanced
as a methodology that holds promise for clarifying unclear portions of
constitutional text or for filling lacunae in the document. That is not the
use to which it is being put in the context of the Citizenship Clause. Here,
the originalist claim is in essence that seemingly clear words mean
something other than what they say; that the language was adopted with
mental reservation or qualification that should prevent our giving them
their plain meaning. In essence, the claim is that the Framers did not really
mean what they said. They could not have.
The intellectual framework of this critique of the current law derives
from Citizenship Without Consent by Peter Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, a
book that outlines two conceptions of citizenship, ―ascriptive‖ and
―consensual.‖10 In this analysis, citizenship that attaches by birth raises
questions of legitimacy, for it involves no act of assent by the new citizen,
and (if the citizen is born to a citizen of a different country) by her parents
either. This concept is seen as medieval in origin and as contravening the

the existence of a non-existent legal norm; ―illegal aliens‖ who have American-born
children are not ―immune from deportation,‖ though they may plead the hardship to their
citizen children of deportation. Second, by verbal legerdemain it transforms human beings,
innocent of crime, into objects made of lead, whose only significance is their utility in the
offenses of lawbreakers. What would have been the result had the question been worded,
―Should the United States government punish American citizens for the crimes of their
parents?‖
8. Andy Barr, Graham Eyes ―Birthright Citizenship‖, POLITICO, July 29, 2010,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/40395.html.
9. The obsolete term for a ―person whose status is midway between being
an alien and a natural-born or naturalized subject‖ is ―denizen.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY
499 (9th ed. 2009).
10. PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 4 (1985).
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trend of contemporary political theory about citizenship.11 Advocates of
abolishing or modifying birthright citizenship note also that many
contemporary nations do not provide it, suggesting by implication that the
Clause is an antiquated remnant of a former time without relevance to
present demographic issues.12
Schuck and Smith‘s argument has been elaborated and refined into a
legal argument, most prominently by one of the pioneers of contemporary
―originalism,‖ former United States Attorney General Edwin L. Meese,
who
helped
coin
the
term
during
the
1980s.
In 2004, Meese, as amicus curiae, submitted a brief in the case of Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld,13 which turned on the issue of whether the United States Armed
Forces could detain Yasser Esam Hamdi as an ―enemy combatant‖ without
affording him the procedures specified by the Constitution.14 The Meese
brief argued that the Court should moot the issue by holding that Hamdi,
the child of two Saudi citizens temporarily resident in the United States,
was not a United States citizen within the proper interpretation of the
Citizenship Clause.15 This claim is all the more constitutionally remarkable
because Hamdi‘s parents, though aliens, were legal residents of Louisiana
at the time of his birth, present on temporary visas.16
Counsel of record for the Meese Brief was Dean John C. Eastman of
Chapman University.17 The brief argued that ―the clear intent of the
Framers who adopted and the people who ratified‖ the Citizenship Clause
11. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 12 (―English law assumed from antiquity
that all persons born within the dominions of the Crown . . . were English subjects.‖).
12. In the general debate on immigration policy, the originalist arguments for judicial or
legislative re-interpretation of the Clause co-exist with a set of policy-based arguments that
suggest that, regardless of the text or ―intent‖ of the Clause, birthright citizenship is an
antiquated and dangerous policy that should be revoked even if doing so requires
amendment of the Clause by use of the Article V process. This argument was first
prominently advanced by then-Governor Pete Wilson of California, who advocated
restrictions of the rights of ―illegal aliens‖ and non-recognition of their native-born children
as citizens during his second term as governor and as a candidate for the Republican
presidential nomination in 1996. See Natalie Smith, Developments in the Legislative
Branch: Bill Challenges Birthright Citizenship, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 325, 325 (2006)
(summarizing legislative efforts to declare native-born children of ―illegal aliens‖ noncitizens). Legislation by which Congress would declare children of ―illegal aliens‖ no
longer entitled to citizenship was introduced in 1997 and has re-emerged repeatedly since
then.
13. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
14. Id. at 509; Brief for The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence
as
Amicus
Curia
Supporting
Respondents,
Hamdi,
542
U.S.
507
(No. 03-6696) [hereinafter Claremont Amicus Brief].
15. Claremont Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at *5 (―Mere birth to foreign nationals who
happen to be visiting the United States at the time, as was the case of Hamdi, is not
sufficient for constitutionally-compelled citizenship.‖).
16. Id.
17. Id. at *20.
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―should prevail‖18 and that that ―clear intent‖ of those authoritative Framers
and ratifiers was ―that only a complete jurisdiction, of the kind that brings
with it a total and exclusive allegiance, is sufficient to qualify for the grant
of citizenship to which the people of the United States actually consented
when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.‖19
The Court neither adopted nor addressed the arguments of the brief.20
Dean Eastman, however, argues that the brief scored a victory because
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent for himself and Justice Stevens, begins his
separate opinion in Hamdi by calling the petitioner only a ―presumed‖
citizen of the United States.21
Citizenship Without Consent has been subject to a good deal of scholarly
criticism.22 Professor Gerald Neuman, in a review of the book at the time
of publication, wrote that the authors ―seek to replace the constitutional
language with a meaning that they discern in the legislative history.‖23 But
the book has been highly influential, and many other scholars and thinkers
have echoed its reasoning. Charles Wood, former counsel to the Senate
Judiciary Committee‘s Subcommittee on Immigration, has proposed that
Congress bar ―illegal‖ aliens from the census count and, by statute, bar
their native-born children from citizenship.24 Relying on Schuck and
Smith, among other sources, he reads the inclusive language of the Clause
as in fact exclusive: ―The clause certainly provides that some persons born
18. Id. at *i.
19. Id. at *16.
20. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 523 (2004) (plurality opinion) (―Justice
Scalia largely ignores the context of this case: a United States citizen captured in a foreign
combat zone.‖).
21. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For Dean Eastman‘s claim of partial victory in
Justice Scalia‘s choice of words, see Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and the
Meaning of Sovereignty: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security,
and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 61 (2005) (prepared statement of
John C. Eastman, Professor, Chapman University School of Law) (stating that Justice Scalia
―declined to accept that Hamdi was actually a citizen‖). Dean Eastman is speaking loosely
here: Justice Scalia did not decline to accept anything. The statement, ―I presume he is a
citizen‖ is quite different from ―I decline to accept that he is a citizen.‖ (Imagine the
difference in tone if Henry Morton Stanley had strode out of the jungle and said, ―I decline
to accept that you are Dr. Livingstone.‖).
22. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Book Review: Back to Dred Scott? 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 485, 496 (1987) (noting that Schuck and Smith‘s ―reading of the phrase ‗subject to the
jurisdiction thereof‘ cannot be seriously defended as an exercise in interpretation of the
constitutional text.‖).
23. Id. at 24; see also Societal and Legal Issues Surrounding Children Born in the
United States to Illegal Alien Parents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Claims and the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 104 (1995) (statement of Gerald L. Neuman, Professor, Columbia University Law
School) (describing Schuck and Smith‘s revisionist theory of the citizenship clause as
―poorly reasoned,‖ ―historically inaccurate,‖ and ―completely circular‖).
24. Charles Wood, Losing Control of America‘s Future—The Census, Birthright
Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 465, 466–68 (1999).
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in the United States are not citizens, namely those who at birth are not
‗subject
to‘
the
jurisdiction
of
the
United
States.‖25
The estimable William Mayton has argued that ―the historically
unimagined fact of the huge number, perhaps twelve million or more, of
persons unlawfully within the United States has stressed our
understandings of birthright citizenship.‖26 Birthright citizenship, Mayton
argues, cannot be a correct reading of the Clause, because
[a]t times jus soli now makes no sense at all. . . . [j]us soli can be unfair
to those made a citizen by it. Citizenship carries with it burdens, such as
loyalty, military service, and taxation, that are surely undue when
imposed on a person of a relation to a nation no greater than a
happenstance of birth on its soil.27
25. Id. at 503. As a matter of logic, this interpretation is invalid. To say ―if X then Y‖
does not mean that there exists a class of not-X that is not Y. ―All people in this room are
human beings‖ is not equivalent to ―there are some people not in this room who are not
human beings.‖
26. William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221, 224 (2008).
27. Id. at 223. One answer to the ―why?‖ question is that ―the Constitution says they
are.‖ The argument then becomes, ―Why should the Constitution say that?‖ That perhaps is
a valid center of argument. However, even if the next step is, ―The Constitution shouldn‘t
say that,‖ the valid conclusion is not, ―therefore the Constitution doesn‘t really say that.‖ As
for the burdens that voiding birthright citizenship will supposedly lift from the shoulders of
native-born children, as long as they remain resident in the United States, legally or
otherwise, they in fact are subject to taxation. As for military service, there is currently no
conscription in the United States. However, the government has issued this warning:
ATTENTION, UNDOCUMENTED MALES & IMMIGRANT SERVICING GROUPS!
....
If you are a man ages 18 through 25 and living in the U.S., then you
must register with Selective Service. It‘s the law.
You can register at any U.S. Post Office and do not need a social
security number. When you do obtain a social security number, let
Selective Service know. Provide a copy of your new social security
number card; being sure to include your complete name, date of birth,
Selective Service registration number, and current mailing address; and
mail to the Selective Service System, P.O. Box 94636, Palatine, IL
60094-4636.
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, http://www.sss.gov (last visited Sept. 24, 2010). The argument
that birthright citizenship is unfair has no bearing on whether it reflects the Framers‘ intent.
Many constitutional provisions (e.g., Article I‘s provision for equal representation in the
Senate) are arguably unfair, but they are no less binding. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1
(amended 1913). In a larger sense, the unfairness argument proves too much. If the
burdens and benefits of birthright citizenship are unprincipled when given to children of
undocumented aliens, then they are just as unfair when showered upon the children of
citizens and lawful residents. Professor Ayelet Shachar has recently written a penetrating
study of this unfairness, comparing inherited citizenship to inequitable laws of property.
See generally AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL
INEQUALITY (2009). As she notes, ―[t]he children of well-off polities have done nothing to
merit more opportunities in life than the children of poorer nations, yet the current
property/membership system grants the former ample privileges without imposing any
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Mayton draws heavily on Schuck and Smith to argue that
birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment entails the gauge
classically identified by Emer de Vattel. This gauge is the ―moral
relation of the parents to the state.‖ By this relation, the strands of
commitment and contribution essential to the democratic community are
strengthened. This relation includes fairness . . . .28

For this reason, Mayton argues that citizenship should not be decided by
courts as a matter of constitutional right, but under the plenary control of
Congress.29
Of all these legal and scholarly stirrings, most significant in a practical
sense, perhaps, is the fact that Judge Richard Posner has all but invited a
lawsuit before his court that would offer him a chance to hack birthright
citizenship out of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 Such a lawsuit may soon
arise in another circuit. The sponsor of Arizona‘s Senate Bill 1070, which
attempted stepped-up enforcement against and exclusion of undocumented
aliens,31 has now announced plans to introduce an even more punitive bill
corresponding obligations upon them to break down the concentration of wealth, security,
and freedom that they have done nothing to earn.‖ Id. at 91. I have not heard any of the
advocates of a restrictive reading of the Citizenship Clause call for stripping citizenship
from the children of citizens. Neither set of children, however, has done anything to merit
citizenship. Similarly, neither has done anything to forfeit it. Those who advocate treating
them radically differently on the basis of their parents‘ estate in life, I think, should bear the
burden of explaining why.
28. Mayton, supra note 26, at 224–25.
29. See id. at 225 (contending that although the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant
birthright citizenship to persons here illegally, Congress maintains the authority to grant
birthright citizenship to these persons).
30. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.,
concurring). Posner took the random opportunity of a challenge to the deportation of the
alien mother of two natural-born children (in which there was no issue whatsoever about the
citizenship of the children) to opine that really none of these people should be citizens at all:
Congress should rethink . . . awarding citizenship to everyone born in the United
States (with a few very minor exceptions, such as the children of accredited foreign
diplomats and of foreign heads of state on official visits to the U.S.), including the
children of illegal immigrants whose sole motive in immigrating was to confer U.S.
citizenship on their as yet unborn children. This rule, though thought by some
compelled by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . makes no sense. . . .
. . . A constitutional amendment may be required to change the rule whereby birth
in this country automatically confers U.S. citizenship, but I doubt it. . . . The
purpose of the rule was to grant citizenship to the recently freed slaves, and the
exception for children of foreign diplomats and heads of state shows that Congress
does not read the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment literally.
Congress would not be flouting the Constitution if it amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act to put an end to the nonsense. On May 5, 2003, H.R. 1567, a bill
―To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to deny citizenship at birth to
children born in the United States of parents who are not citizens or permanent
resident aliens,‖ was referred to the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims. I hope it passes.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
31. See 2010 ARIZ. SESS. LAWS 113. S.B. 1070 has been enjoined by the United States
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that would attempt to strip American-born children of these aliens of their
American citizenship.32
This Article considers the meaning of the Citizenship Clause as a matter
of constitutional history on the one hand and constitutional policy on the
other. I recently published a book-length study of the legislative framing of
the Fourteenth Amendment.33 During the research and writing of the book,
I was struck by the detail and sophistication of the congressional debate
about immigration issues that accompanied passage of the Amendment. I
have drawn on that research to assemble a picture of the ―legislative
history‖ of the Clause. My reading of this material impels me to a sharply
different conclusion than that reached by advocates of a restrictive reading.
In my view, the history of the Amendment‘s framing lends no support to
the idea that native-born American children should be divided into citizen
and non-citizen classes depending on the immigration status of their
parents.
I do not claim to have divined the ―original intent‖ of the Framers of the
Amendment as to this issue, which was one that was not precisely present
in
the
law
in
1866,
the
year
of
the
framing.
We simply cannot know how members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress would
have responded to Lou Dobbs‘s question. We can, however, investigate
some things. First, and most readily accessible, is what the Framers said as
they debated the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second is the
intellectual and political background upon which they drew in the writing
of the Amendment. Finally, we can understand the overall situation that
gave rise to the Amendment—what recent events had occurred and what
overall social concerns they sparked.
We can examine the intellectual history of nineteenth century antislavery thought for concepts relevant to the debates over immigration and
District Court for the District of Arizona pending a trial on the issue of whether it usurps
federal
authority
over
immigration.
United
States
v.
Arizona,
703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010).
32. Adam Klawonn, Arizona‘s Next Immigration Target: Children of Illegals, TIME,
June 11, 2010, available at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1996064,00.html.
33. GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (2006) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY
REBORN]; see also Garrett Epps, Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment: Two Don‘ts and
Three Dos, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 433 (2007) [hereinafter Don‘ts and Dos]; Garrett
Epps, Lecture,
Second Founding:
The Story of the Fourteenth Amendment,
85 OR. L. REV. 895 (2006) [hereinafter Second Founding]; Garrett Epps, The Antebellum
Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175
(2004) [hereinafter Antebellum Political Background]; Garrett Epps, The Undiscovered
Country: Northern Views of the Defeated South and the Political Background of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 411 (2004) [hereinafter
Undiscovered Country].
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its proper role in our society, and we can take notice of what the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment said when the issue of immigration came
before them. In so doing, it seems to me, we need not shoulder the burden
of ―demonstrating‖ that the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, if conjured
before us,34 would say, ―Of course we meant that.‖ In the particular area in
which we are working, we are faced with a claim by Dean Eastman and
others that they have already communed with the dead, that an unclear
reading was the Framers‘ ―clear intent.‖ The question in the first instance
is not what the ―original intent‖ was, but rather whether those who make
―originalist‖ claims to have deduced it have borne their burden of proof.
As for the policy-based arguments, past history cannot provide
determinate answers to present policy puzzles. However, we may be able
to glean suggestions about desirable policies today from a
study of failed and successful policies past. That the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s text evinces an intent to alter citizenship policy is evidence.
The historical background of its writing may provide us with evidence of
what constitutional flaw the Framers were addressing, and thus warn us not
to repeat the mistakes that they felt impelled to fix.
In Part I of this Article, I provide a brief summary of the conclusions I
reached during my study of the framing of the Amendment about the
overall significance of the Amendment in the political and constitutional
dispute that framed the Civil War and Reconstruction. I then summarize
the ―originalist‖ argument for a restrictive reading of the Clause. Part II
offers my analysis of the actual legislative record of the framing of the
Clause. Part III provides a brief summary of the citizenship status of
American Indians in 1866, because that status formed an important part of
the debate over the proper scope of the Clause. Part IV offers a look at the
ideas of citizenship that arose out of the anti-slavery struggle and that
formed the intellectual background of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part V compares the situation those Framers faced with the
immigration situation we face today. In my Conclusion, I examine the
―constitutional policy‖ underlying the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole
and suggest that birthright citizenship fits far better into the most plausible
policies we can derive from the text and history of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I argue that the advocates for penalizing native-born children on the basis
of their parents‘ immigration status would drive a major hole through the
important protections offered the American people by the Fourteenth
34. See generally Garrett Epps, Of Constitutional Séances and Color-Blind Ghosts,
72 N.C. L. REV. 401, 408 (1994).
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Amendment. The mistake thus made would not be a novel error, but
precisely the same mistake that was made at Philadelphia in 1787 and
subsequently, as the antebellum order was constructed around legalized
inequality and subordination of African Americans. The advocates of
creating a new non-citizen status for native-born children, I argue, are in
danger of (inadvertently) creating a modern analogue of the post-slavery
subordination that was occurring during the months before the framing of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Framers of the Amendment had
present in their minds as they constructed its provisions.
I.

THINKING ABOUT THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

In a recent article, I suggested that interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment is improved by considering several positive and negative
hypotheses that some other commentators do not share.35 First, the positive
assertions:
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the generation of
political thinkers from which they sprang, regarded the 1787 Constitution
as profoundly flawed.36
―[B]y giving the slave states disproportionate power in the federal
government,‖ they believed, ―[it] had created and empowered a complex
political-social institution that the antebellum generation called the Slave
Power.‖37
The Republican leadership in the Thirty-Ninth Congress found itself in
an unexpected conflict with President Andrew Johnson, who sought to
remove Congress from any influence on Reconstruction policy or postwar
politics.38 As a result, the leadership decided to write ―a multi-part,
compromise amendment whose parts are best understood as forming a
whole that, while not entirely coherent, does have a certain underlying
congruence of concern.‖39
The two negative propositions are:
35. For a more detailed explanation of these assertions, see generally Don‘ts and Dos,
supra note 33, at 441–57 (detailing the legislative history that led to the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
36. Id. at 448–51 (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted in an attempt
to remedy problems found within the Constitution).
37. Id. at 451. See generally LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER: THE FREE
NORTH AND SOUTHERN DOMINATION, 1780–1861 2 (2000) (describing the slave power thesis
as a widely held ―notion that a slaveholding oligarchy ran the country—and ran it for their
own advantage‖).
38. See Epps, Don‘ts and Dos, supra note 33, at 455 (―Because of Congress‘s refusal to
seat members from the South, Johnson argued, plenary authority over Reconstruction rested
with him and him alone.‖).
39. Id. at 456.

GARRETT EPPS 60.2

342

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:331

The Fourteenth Amendment was not aimed solely at providing a
minimum set of rights aimed only at racial discrimination against the freed
slaves.40 In fact, it creates ―a broader set of rules for state politics and law,‖
which were inspired by the problems of immigrants and Southern
Unionists.41
The Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to provide a constitutional
foundation for the Civil Rights Act of 1866; nor was it offered because its
sponsors considered the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional otherwise.42
The ―originalist‖ argument is that the legislative debates and (to a lesser
extent) the overall history of American citizenship and political theory
show a ―clear intent‖ that birthright citizenship should extend only to
children of American citizens and perhaps of lawful permanent residents,
but not reach the children of foreign nationals temporarily resident in the
United States, whether legally or illegally. In order to evaluate this
argument, a reader need not accept my theses completely. Instead, the
interpretive process should begin with the interpretation we have been
offered by advocates of a restrictive reading of the Clause, and should use
constitutional tools, of which history is a prominent one, to assess the
correctness of the suggested interpretation.
The historical background cited by Dean Eastman is that sketched by
Professors Schuck and Smith in their work on the theory of citizenship in
Anglo-American legal theory. The thesis of this work, and of subsequent
work relied upon by restrictionists, is that modern, as opposed to feudal,
citizenship requires consent of the citizen and a willingness to subject
herself to the complete dominance of the nation. Thus, children of
temporary sojourners—and, for that matter, any persons retaining
citizenship in more than one country at the same time—cannot be viewed
as fulfilling the conditions for citizenship under a proper modern definition.
Citizenship Without Consent is the foundation of the argument for a
restrictive reading and thus merits a close reading. That I disagree with its
conclusions
should
not
suggest
that
I
deprecate
its
scholarly seriousness. But I will suggest that it has two shortcomings:
(1) it produces seemingly valid conclusions from the wrong sources and (2)
it shortchanges and misunderstands the actual legislative record of the
Clause.
40. Id. at 441–42 (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296
(1976)) (noting that the Supreme Court ―has recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
contains ‗a broader principle than would have been necessary simply to meet the particular
and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves‘‖).
41. Id. at 442–43.
42. Id. at 445–48 (arguing that the Citizenship Clause was drafted ―with a broad set of
political and civil rights in mind‖).
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The authors begin by tracing the conflict between ―ascriptive and
consensual citizenship.‖43 Ascriptive citizenship, the condition of being a
subject of the Crown by virtue of birth within the Realm, meant that a
subject had neither the right to disobey nor to renounce citizenship even by
expatriation.44
The authors suggest that with the dawn of the
Enlightenment, authors, most prominently John Locke, called into question
the justice and validity of the ascriptive principle, suggesting instead that
true allegiance and citizenship could be based only on reciprocal consent.
For Locke, ―[a] child . . . could not be a government‘s subject because
subjectship must be based on the tacit or explicit consent of an individual
who had reached the age of rational discretion.‖45 For this reason, ―Locke
insisted: ‗a Child is born a subject of no Country and Government.‘‖46
Locke ―would have been astonished that children of illegal aliens might
acquire membership in a country by birth.‖47
The authors note that Locke is generally agreed to be a significant
influence on the thinking of the Framers of the 1787 Constitution. They
further cite the work of G.J.A. Pocock as evidencing the importance for the
Framers of the ―Atlantic tradition‖ of republican thought stemming from
the
work
of
Niccolo
Machiavelli.48
In Atlantic republican thought, republican societies were thought to require
small size, internal homogeneity, and restricted citizenship.49
Citizenship restriction, they suggest, is Lockean as well as
Machiavellian:
[T]he logic of Locke‘s formulation of the social contract doctrine, like
Rousseau‘s, indicated that consent to membership must indeed be
mutual, granted by the representatives of the existing citizenry as well as
by the prospective citizen. Hence his view, as much as the republicans‘,
implicitly sanctioned the permissibility, if not the desirability, of
restrictive membership policies, at least so long as those restrictions did
not amount to active violations of one‘s natural rights.50

And they note that much of antebellum American law, most particularly
the infamous Taney opinion in Scott v. Sandford51 (―Dred Scott‖), relied

43. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 9–10.
44. See id. at 12, 17 (noting that expatriation was ―considered contrary to natural law
and therefore impossible‖).
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 25–26.
48. Id. at 27 (citing J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975)).
49. Id. at 27–29.
50. Id. at 30–31.
51. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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heavily on a consensual model, holding that persons of African descent
were forever barred from citizenship because the Framers had not
consented to their acquisition of it by any means.52 Schuck and Smith
further argue that American citizenship law before the Fourteenth
Amendment showed an inability to decide between ascription and consent
as the basis of citizenship:
American law‘s use of both ascriptive and consensual understandings of
the birthrights of the native-born makes it difficult to know precisely
what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Citizenship Clause had
in mind, a difficulty not altogether alleviated by their debates. It is
therefore all the more important to recognize that the American
Congress, courts, and statesmen had always drawn freely on both
traditions, selecting among them largely on grounds of expediency.53

They then proceed to a very brief discussion of the Citizenship Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and conclude that the ―subject to the
jurisdiction‖ language embodies a restrictive, consensual definition of
citizenship.54 The Amendment‘s ―central political ideas were not ascription
and allegiance but consent and individual rights,‖ they contend.55 They
reach this conclusion because they assert the common wisdom that
―Congress‘s purpose in proposing the Fourteenth Amendment . . . was to
‗constitutionalize‘ the protections established by the [Civil Rights Act of
1866]‖ thus making the differences in wording between the Act and the
Clause irrelevant.56
To Schuck and Smith, the important question was what Senator Lyman
Trumbull meant by the language. Trumbull was the drafter of the Civil
Rights Bill; he played no role in the drafting of the Amendment. Thus,
―subject to the jurisdiction,‖ the Amendment‘s language, becomes
equivalent to ―not subject to any foreign power,‖ the eventual language of
the Civil Rights Bill. Subjection to a foreign power depended on
allegiance, and, the authors contend, the Civil Rights ―debates revealed that
Trumbull understood allegiance not chiefly in Coke‘s terms, as stemming

52. Though the authors do not note this, the principle of Dred Scott is actually
ascriptive in the highest, as not even the consent of both parties to the social contract—i.e.,
an aspiring citizen of African descent and a willing Congress making use of the
naturalization power—could overcome the (unwritten or spoken) ascription by the Founding
Generation of alien status to such people. See id. at 452 (declaring the Missouri
Compromise unconstitutional, and holding that Dred Scott could not be made free by being
brought to Missouri by his owner, even if his owner had the intention of becoming a
permanent resident in Missouri).
53. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 71.
54. Id. at 85–87.
55. Id. at 73.
56. Id. at 75.
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from the fact of protection at birth, but in a more consensualist fashion, as
dependent upon the wills of the community and the individual.‖57
Little of this argument depends on the actual legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment; but remarkably, a good deal of it arises out of the
fact (which might as reasonably be ascribed to happenstance) that the
Amendment was finally approved by the states during the Fortieth, not the
Thirty-Ninth. The Fortieth Congress passed the first formal act permitting
United States citizens to renounce their citizenship.
Congress could not have conceived of that obligation [of birthright
citizenship] as perpetual or indissoluble on [the natural-born citizen‘s]
part. Only one day before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
Congress embraced the consensual conception of citizenship in a more
direct and thoroughgoing way, affirming in the Expatriation Act of 1868
the fundamental right of all citizens voluntarily to withdraw their consent
and to renounce their membership.58

This is a remarkable conclusion to draw from the mere coincidence of
time. Schuck and Smith gloss over the fact that Congress plays no part in
ratification of Amendments, which is done by state legislatures and
recorded (at that time) by the Secretary of State.59 As legislative history
goes, then, the Schuck and Smith argument is a fairly unusual one. It
slights the actual language of the measure and the debates of the body that
framed it, and insists on the primacy of (1) the language of and debates
about a different measure (the Civil Rights Act) and (2) the unstated
intentions of a different body (the Fortieth Congress). Schuck and Smith
bolster their reading of the real meaning of the clause on a couple of
grounds that are important to constitutional construction generally. The
first might be called the argument for constitutional policy.
In this case, they argue that the current reading of the Clause calls into
question the underlying consistency and workability of the Constitution,
and thus is potentially illegitimate:
America‘s current circumstances confirm that birthright citizenship can
create a problem of overinclusiveness, at least in consensual terms. In
particular, automatic political membership for the native-born children of
illegal aliens and nonimmigrants seems difficult to defend, especially
when access to citizenship for other needy groups must be limited.60

57. Id. at 80.
58. Id. at 86 (footnote omitted).
59. Thus, for example, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, proposed by the First
Congress in 1789, was finally ratified in 1992. Can the debates of the 102nd Congress then
tell us something about the ―intent‖ of the framers of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment?
60. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 89.
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This policy argument is coupled with the common (and again, far from
illegitimate when correctly made) argument that the Framers could not
have foreseen current conditions:
The number of illegal aliens presently in the United States is a matter of
great and continuing controversy; estimates that are described as
―conservative‖ place the range at three and a half to six million as of
1980, with the number increasing by two hundred thousand annually.
This reality and the fears that it has generated concerning its economic
and social effects have transformed political discourse about American
immigration policy in ways that neither [past courts] nor the
Reconstruction framers of the Citizenship Clause could have
anticipated.61

In particular, the authors suggest that children of illegal immigrants did
not at the time of Framing, do not now, and should not fall within the
meaning of ―subject to the jurisdiction.‖ This is because the children carry
at birth the taint of their parents‘ criminality: ―The parents of such children
are, by definition, individuals whose presence within the jurisdiction of the
United States is prohibited by law. They [the parents] are manifestly
individuals, therefore, to whom the society has explicitly and selfconsciously decided to deny membership.‖62
The Schuck and Smith argument thus considers (in roughly this order)
(1) the intellectual background of American citizenship and the Citizenship
Clause, in particular; (2) the circumstances and debate that surrounded its
adoption; (3) the ―constitutional policy‖ underlying its current application;
and (4) the likelihood that the Framers foresaw something like the present
circumstances. Each of their conclusions requires evidence to support it,
and our task is to assess the nature and amount of evidence they have
adduced for each.
Schuck and Smith, as noted above, provide a truncated and
(it must be said) idiosyncratic reading of the Clause‘s ―legislative history.‖
Let‘s consider a more thoroughgoing and disciplined version of this,
offered by Dean Eastman.
[T]he language of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, from which the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (like the rest of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment) was derived so as to provide a more certain
constitutional foundation for the 1866 Act, strongly suggests that
Congress did not intend to provide for such a broad and absolute
birthright citizenship.63

61. Id. at 93.
62. Id. at 95.
63. John C. Eastman, Politics and the Court: Did the Supreme Court Really Move Left
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This language, as enacted, was ―all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States.‖64
Dean Eastman claims that ―this formulation makes clear, [that] any child
born on U.S. soil to parents who were temporary visitors to this country
and who, as a result of the foreign citizenship of the child‘s parents,
remained a citizen or subject of the parents‘ home country, was not entitled
to claim the birthright citizenship provided in the 1866 Act.‖65 The
relevance of this supposed clarity, of course, is not direct, because the aim
is to interpret the language of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Citizenship
Clause, which says that ―[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside.‖66 Dean Eastman admits that
this language lacks the alleged clarity of the language in the Act, and
indeed ―might easily have been intended to describe a broader grant of
citizenship than the negatively phrased language from the 1866 Act—one
more in line with the contemporary understanding . . . that birth on U.S.
soil is sufficient for citizenship.‖67
This is an important admission, because to discern ―clear intent‖ in
language that ―might easily‖ be read a different way requires strong
evidence that the Framers intended one specific reading. To resolve this
ambiguity, Dean Eastman turns to the legislative debates:
[T]he relatively sparse debate we have regarding this provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not support such a reading. For example,
when pressed about whether Indians living on reservations would be
covered by the clause since they were ―most clearly subject to our
jurisdiction, both civil and military,‖ Senator Lyman Trumbull, a key
figure in the drafting and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
responded that ―subject to the jurisdiction‖ of the United States meant
subject to its ―complete‖ jurisdiction, ―[n]ot owing allegiance to anybody
else.‖ Senator Jacob Howard, who introduced the language of the
jurisdiction clause on the floor of the Senate, contended that it should be
construed to mean ―a full and complete jurisdiction . . . the same
Because of Embarrassment Over Bush v. Gore? 94 GEO. L.J. 1475, 1485–86 (2006).
64. Id. at 1486 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866)
(emphasis added)).
65. Id.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. Eastman, supra note 63, at 1486. This seems like a concession on Dean Eastman‘s
part—the ―clear intent‖ must be deduced from unclear text, but it conceals a hidden
premise—that the text is in fact ambiguous or unclear. The first necessity for a
counterintuitive ―originalist‖ reading is ambiguity in the text. If ―all persons‖ really means
―all persons‖ then the deployment of originalist machinery is hardly necessary, and if the
machinery produces a different reading its very validity is questionable.
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jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United
States now‖ (i.e., under the 1866 Act). That meant that the children of
Indians who still ―belong[ed] to a tribe‖ and hence owed allegiance to
another sovereign (however dependent the sovereign was) would not
qualify for citizenship under the Clause. Because of this interpretative
gloss provided by the authors of the provision, an amendment offered by
Senator James Doolittle of Wisconsin to explicitly exclude ―Indians not
taxed,‖ as the 1866 Act had done, was rejected as redundant.68

From this summary of the debate, Dean Eastman then concludes that the
correct meaning of the Clause is that supplied by the majority in The
Slaughterhouse Cases:69 ―[T]he ‗main purpose‘ of the Clause ‗was to
establish the citizenship of the negro,‘ and that ‗[t]he phrase, ‗subject to its
jurisdiction‘ was intended to exclude from its operation children of
ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the
United States.‘‖70
This, then, is the ―originalist‖ claim to establish the ―clear intent‖ of the
Framers and ratifiers. Thus, it would be significant if (as I suggest) the
argument (1) misapprehends the contemporaneous intellectual background
of the Clause; (2) mischaracterizes the relationship between the Civil
Rights Act and the Clause; (3) distorts the tenor of (or simply neglects to
quote) the legislative debates around the Clause itself; (4) offers an
implausible reading of the constitutional policy embodied in the
Amendment as a whole; and (5) fails to understand that, historically, the
Framers of the Amendment faced a situation with regard to immigration
policy that was in fact remarkably similar to, not radically different from,
our current one. Weakness or invalidity in one or more of the stages of the
argument, it seems to me, would suggest that proponents of a restrictive
―intent‖ of the Clause have failed to carry their burden of proof.
II. THE FRAMING OF THE CLAUSE: BACKGROUND AND DEBATE
The quest for the ―clear intent‖ of the Framers of the Clause ought to
begin with what the Framers said, first in the text of the Clause and second
during the debates over its adoption. The Thirty-Ninth Congress dealt with
the issue of birth and citizenship in two different bills, first in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and second in the Fourteenth Amendment. It is
important to resist the temptation to treat these two measures and the

68. Id. (footnotes omitted).
69. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
70. Eastman, supra note 63, at 1486–87.
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debates over them as if they were one and the same.71 They originated with
different sponsors and were buttressed by different constitutional theories.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was adopted first, was sponsored by
Senator Lyman Trumbull, chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and
reported by that Committee for adoption by the Senate and then the House.
The Act was a conservative measure, designed to conciliate President
Johnson and gain his signature.72 According to its sponsor, the Act as a
whole was enacted pursuant to section two of the Thirteenth Amendment,
and the specific citizenship language was authorized by Congress‘s
Naturalization Power.73 The Act was designed to put the responsibility for
enforcing civil rights in the hands of the federal courts.74
But, despite its conservatism, Andrew Johnson vetoed it, in essence
proclaiming himself opposed to any attempts to upset the antebellum
political system of white rule and ―states‘ rights.‖ Johnson‘s veto of the
Act, and of the Freedmen‘s Bureau Act, radicalized the political situation in
Washington and convinced most of the Congressional leadership that no
conciliation was possible. A mark of that radicalization is that Congress repassed both bills over the President‘s veto—the first time in American
history that a Presidential veto of a substantive bill had been overridden.75
During this near-revolutionary period, the Fourteenth Amendment
was drafted, not by Trumbull and the Judiciary Committee but by the
considerably more radical Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction.
That committee was seeking to wrest control of Reconstruction from
Johnson. Because it was offering a constitutional amendment, it did not
worry about the limits of congressional power under the Thirteenth
Amendment; because a President has no veto power over a proposed
constitutional amendment, it made no concessions to the President‘s
conservative views. Neither in its language nor in the debates surrounding
its passage is there any suggestion that, like the Civil Rights Bill, it was a
―court bill.‖
For all these reasons, it seems at best reductive to assume that the
citizenship language in both had identical meanings and ―intentions.‖ If
that is to be a premise of the restrictive reading of the document, it must be

71. See Don‘ts and Dos, supra note 33, at 445–57.
72. EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 175–76.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power ―to establish an uniform
rule of naturalization‖).
74. Democracy Reborn, supra note 33, at 175 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST
SESS. 605 (1866)) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull) (―It is a court bill; it is to be executed through
the courts, and in no other way.‖).
75. EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 183.
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subject to the same burden of proof as the other premises; the proponents
have not even tried to bear that burden.
As originally written, Trumbull‘s Civil Rights Bill proclaimed that all
persons of ―African descent‖ resident in the United States were citizens.
However, on January 30, Trumbull withdrew this language and offered an
amendment to insert this language: ―[A]ll persons born in the United
States, and not subject to any foreign Power, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States . . . .‖76
It is this Civil Rights Bill language that the proponents of a restrictive
reading of the Clause regard as indicating the Fourteenth Amendment
Framers‘ ―intent‖ to limit birthright citizenship to, in essence, children
whose parents had no other citizenship status elsewhere in the world. The
argument is that children of foreign citizens temporarily resident in the
United States are ―subject to [the] foreign power‖ governing their parents‘
citizenship. Immediately after the new wording was offered, however,
Trumbull engaged in a colloquy that sheds a considerably different light on
this provision. Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania, a conservative
Republican and one of Johnson‘s few remaining Republican supporters in
Congress, archly asked Trumbull whether this language would naturalize
the ―children of Chinese and Gypsies born in this country?‖ Trumbull
replied, ―Undoubtedly.‖77
What is the importance of this colloquy? Well, consider that in 1866,
Chinese-born people resident in the United States were ineligible to
naturalize as citizens. Under the Naturalization Act of 1790, naturalized
citizenship was limited to ―free white person[s].‖78 Thus, every immigrant
from China was by definition not only an alien but a ―subject‖ of the
Chinese empire and thus not subject to the ―full and complete jurisdiction‖
that originalists regard as important restrictive language.
But if this was the intended meaning of ―not subject to a foreign power,‖
how could it be ―[u]ndoubtedly‖ true that children of Chinese were to be
citizens under the Civil Rights Act? The answer seems nonsensical; and
before we deal with the anomaly by suggesting that Trumbull simply did
not understand what he was talking about, remember that Trumbull‘s is
preeminent among those whose ―clear intent‖ we are supposedly parsing.
The casual reference to ―Gypsies‖ in Senator Cowan‘s question also
foreshadowed a theme that would become quite important during the
debate over the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chinese

76. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 498 (1866).
77. Id.
78. An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
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immigrants were present in the United States legally, and were (as we have
seen)
citizens
of
another
nation.
The ―Gypsies‖ in the United States (assuming there were any) were the
closest thing the United States had at that time to ―illegal‖ immigrants—a
shadow population that was considered to be living in defiance of
American law.79 Their status and the language used about them
subsequently in the debate are quite suggestive.80
Who, then, were those not subject to ―the full and complete jurisdiction‖
of the United States? There were two classes. The first covered ―children
of public ministers‖—what we would call diplomats today, who were
covered by diplomatic immunity under international law. The second was
a subset of the Native American population—those living under tribal
government on reservations under treaties that recognized their tribes as
separate sovereigns and those resident on the frontier in territory and
among tribal groups that had not been reduced to federal control. The first
group of Native people were ―subject‖ to their tribal governments, which
had treaty immunities to U.S. court jurisdiction. The second were not
subject to U.S. jurisdiction at all—they were ―wild Indians.‖
Bear in mind that we are still discussing the Civil Rights Act. As
eventually adopted, it read, ―[a]ll persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States.‖ This language is significant
but does not directly demonstrate anything about the ―clear intent‖ of the
Citizenship Clause. First, it is a statute, enacted under the authority of
some combination of the Naturalization Clause and the Thirteenth
Amendment; the Fourteenth Amendment is a change to the Constitution,
creating entirely new rights and providing government with new powers.
Second, it is different in wording. Even if we were to conclude that ―not

79. This is of course true as a statement of the relatively undeveloped federal law of
immigration before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. There were, however, other
classes of people who were not supposed to be present in the specific states, and in the
antebellum period they were subject to penalties under state law that echo some of those
aimed
at
―illegal
aliens‖
today.
See
Neuman,
supra
note
23,
at 497–99. Professor Neuman also asks whether Schuck and Smith could possibly be
suggesting that the Amendment does not recognize the citizenship of native-born children of
African slaves imported in violation of the 1808 federal statute that prohibited importation
of slaves. Those African slaves were in the country illegally, in the teeth of efforts to
discourage their entry. See id.
80. Gypsies in 1866 existed mostly as a bugaboo in the mind of Nativists (like the phantom
cases of leprosy frequently mentioned by Lou Dobbs or the ―terror babies‖ being cleverly
spawned in U.S. hospitals so that they can commit suicide bombings a generation from
now). ―For example in 1874, the American Cyclopaedia argued that it was ‗questionable
whether a band of genuine Gypsies has ever been in America.‘‖ BRIAN A. BELTON,
QUESTIONING GYPSY IDENTITY: ETHNIC NARRATIVES IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 85 (2005).

GARRETT EPPS 60.2

352

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:331

subject to any foreign power‖ had a more restrictive meaning than its
sponsors appeared to give it, the language was superseded by the broader
language of the Citizenship Clause. So even if we could demonstrate the
―clear intent‖ of the Congress when it adopted the Act, that ―clear intent‖
could not restrict what the Congress and the state legislatures did later in
adopting the Fourteenth Amendment. And, finally, the evidence does not
establish a ―clear intent‖ to adopt a restrictive meaning. As I read the
record, it points to an opposite intent; but even if my reading is contestable,
I suggest that its plausibility establishes that the ―originalists‖ have signally
failed to bear their burden of proof even as to this preliminary question.
In fact, the meaning that matters in this context is that of the Citizenship
Clause, which was framed by Congress two months after the final passage
of the Civil Rights Act and ratified over the ensuing two years by the state
legislatures. It has different wording; it emerged from a different political
situation; it was adopted under different procedures and had different
authors, and it was approved by different voting bodies.81 Its meaning must
stand on its own. If its broad wording, which makes no mention of
―foreign powers,‖ is to be read restrictively, it must be because of
something in its text or adoption, not because it is viewed as a coded reenactment of the Civil Rights Act.
The draft Fourteenth Amendment was introduced in the House of
Representatives in May 1866, and adopted by the House without any
citizenship language.82 The Journals of the Joint Committee of Fifteen thus
shed no light on its drafting; neither do the initial debates on the draft
amendment in the House, because the draft did not address citizenship
when adopted by the House. The only debate that can shed light on its
intent is that which took place on the Senate floor during the process of
adoption and amendment of the citizenship language.83
81. See EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 183, 226–27 (illustrating the
differences regarding motivation, political climate, and passage/ratification between the
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment).
82. See id. at 225 (demonstrating that most of the House debate focused on
representation and voting, not citizenship).
83. When the amended Joint Resolution was sent back to the House for concurrence,
the only mention of the citizenship language was in the final remarks of Representative
Thaddeus Stevens, the Radical leader of the House, the dominant member of the Joint
Committee of Fifteen, and the primary sponsor of the proposed Amendment. See id. at 40–
50 (providing a brief synopsis of Stevens‘ tenure in Congress). On this occasion, Stevens
described the effect of the draft amendment with no qualification for the jurisdictional
language:
The first section is altered by defining who are citizens of the United States
and of the States. This is an excellent amendment, long needed to settle
conflicting decisions between the several States and the United States. It
declares this great privilege to belong to every person born or naturalized in
the United States.
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When it came to the floor of the Senate on May 23, Senator Benjamin
Wade proposed an amendment that would remove the word ―citizen‖ from
what became the ―privileges or immunities‖ clause and substitute language
barring states from abridging ―the privileges or immunities of persons born
in the United States or naturalized by the laws thereof.‖84 Wade explained,
the word ―citizen‖ . . . is a term about which there has been a good deal
of uncertainty in our Government. The courts have stumbled on the
subject, and even here, at this session, that question has been up and it is
still regarded by some as doubtful. I regard it as settled by the civil
rights
bill,
and,
indeed,
in
my
judgment,
it
was settled before. I have always believed that every person, of
whatever race or color, who was born within the United States was a
citizen of the United States; but by the decisions of the courts there has
been a doubt thrown over that subject; and if the Government should fall
into the hands of those who are opposed to the views that some of us
maintain, those who have been accustomed to take a different view of it,
they may construe the provision in such a way as we do not think it
liable to construction at the time, unless we fortify and make it very
strong and clear.85

This is an unmistakable reference to the restrictive reading of citizenship
given by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott, and Wade‘s change seemed to
be designed to forestall a racial reading of citizenship by later judicial
construction of the Civil Rights Act.86 Wade‘s definition of citizenship, in
his words, was that ―every person, of whatever race or color, who was born
within the United States was a citizen of the United States.‖87
An instructive colloquy ensued between Wade and Senator William Pitt
Fessenden of Maine, chair of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. As
reported by Wade, ―[t]he Senator from Maine suggests to me, in an
undertone, that persons may be born in the United States and yet not be
citizens of the United States. Most assuredly they would be citizens of the
United States unless they went to another country and expatriated
themselves . . . .‖ 88
Fessenden then suggested the very question that concerns us today:
―Suppose a person is born here of parents from abroad temporarily in this
country.‖89 Wade answered,
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 3148 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens).
84. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2768 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Wade).
85. Id. at 2768–69.
86. Perhaps it might even be a sign of ―clear intent‖ that a judicial construction of the
Fourteenth Amendment would never narrow citizenship on similar grounds.
87. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2768 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Wade).
88. Id. at 2769 (remarks of Sen. Wade).
89. Id. (remarks of Sen. Fessenden).
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The Senator says a person may be born here and not be a citizen. I know
that is so in one instance, in the case of the children of foreign ministers
who reside ―near‖ the United States, in the diplomatic language. By a
fiction of law such persons are not supposed to be residing here, and
under that fiction of law their children would not be citizens of the
United States, although born in Washington. I agree to that, but my
answer to the suggestion is that that is a simple matter, for it could hardly
be applicable to more than two or three or four persons; and it would be
best not to alter the law for that case.90

Debate then turned to the meaning of other provisions of the draft
amendment, particularly the language regarding apportionment of
representation to states that restricted the franchise by race. After
adjournment that day, Senate Republicans met in a private caucus to
consider the issues that Wade‘s amendment had brought up.
When the measure returned to the floor on May 30, Senator Jacob
Howard of Michigan, a member of the Joint Committee and the Senate
sponsor of the draft amendment, proposed new language: ―[A]ll persons
born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside.‖ 91 The
debate on this new language forms the core of the evidence for a restrictive
reading of the Citizenship Clause; but read in full, the debate suggests
precisely the opposite reading.
Howard explained the meaning of the new language as
simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that
every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to
their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of
the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the
United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of
ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the
United States, but will include every other class of persons.92

90. Id. (remarks of Sen. Wade).
91. Id. at 2890 (remarks of Sen. Howard).
92. Id. Professor Mayton reads this language as excluding the children of two classes of
aliens from birthright citizenship: first, all ―consular personnel,‖ and, second, ―aliens.‖
Mayton, supra note 26, at 245. That is, we should construe Howard as meaning that the
citizenship clause will exclude the ―two classes,‖ consisting in essence of (1) the children of
all foreigners and (2) the children of some foreigners. Id. Professor Mayton considers his
thesis confirmed because ―at that time no objection was made.‖ Id. The most logical
inference to this reader is that no one objected because no one understood it in the strained
way that Professor Mayton does. At this point in the inquiry, we are in danger of leaving
the world of constitutional history and entering some kind of Da Vinci code alternate
universe. That is, can we really suppose that this one ambiguous phrase spoken by one
senator, no matter how read, can supply us with a code key to general language adopted by
both Houses of Congress and the legislatures of two-thirds of the States? Rather than
picking at coded meanings in disaggregated phrases, an interpreter would do better to
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Once again, the irrepressible Senator Cowan rose to object that the
proponents of the draft amendment could surely not mean that birthright
citizenship would extend to children of Chinese immigrants or of
―Gypsies‖: ―[I]s it proposed that the people of California are to remain
quiescent while they are overrun by a flood of immigration of the Mongol
race? Are they to be immigrated out of house and home by Chinese? I
should think not.‖ Further, his own state of Pennsylvania had to contend
with
a certain number of people who invade her borders; who owe to her no
allegiance; who pretend to owe none; who recognize no authority in her
government; who have a distinct, independent government of their
own—an imperium in imperio; who pay no taxes; who never perform
military service; who do nothing, in fact, which becomes the citizen, and
perform none of the duties which devolve upon him, but, on the other
hand, have no homes, pretend to own no land, live nowhere, settle as
trespassers
wherever
they
go . . . .
I mean the Gypsies. . . . If the mere fact of being born in the country
confers that right, then they will have it; and I think it will be
mischievous.93

Citizenship, in Cowan‘s view, had two essential characteristics that the
proposed amendment would obliterate. First, it was primarily under the
control of the states, and no one could be a United States citizen who was
not first recognized as such by a state.94 Second, the rights of citizenships
were properly drawn from ―my own people, the people of my own blood
and lineage, people of the same religion, people of the same beliefs and
traditions,‖ rather than from ―a society of other men entirely different in all
those respects from myself.‖95

consider the entire debate in its context and Professor Mayton seems to have little interest in
or understanding of political context in the 439th Congress. Later in his article, Professor
Mayton cites statements by Senator Cowan as definitively explaining that the Amendment
did not make children of foreigners citizens. Id. at 243. A reader would not know that
Cowan was the speaker, however, that Cowan was an opponent of the draft Amendment,
nor that Cowan was arguing against its adoption. Professor Mayton seizes upon the
significance of statements made by opponents of a measure and gives them authoritative
force; it is as if one were to consult the papers of Jefferson Davis for definitive exegesis of
the Emancipation Proclamation. As it happens, Davis wrote that the Proclamation was
intended as an ―intimation to the people of the North that they must prepare to submit to a
separation, now become inevitable, for that people are too acute not to understand that a
restoration of the Union has been rendered forever impossible by the adoption of a measure
which, from its very nature, neither admits of retraction nor can coexist with union.‖ See
6 J. OF THE CONG. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 18 (1863).
93. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2890–91 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan).
94. Id. at 2891.
95. Id.
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The response on the floor was delivered by Senator John Conness of
California, himself a naturalized citizen born in Ireland:
The proposition before us, I will say, Mr. President, relates simply to the
children begotten of Chinese parents in California, and it is proposed to
declare that they shall be citizens. . . . I voted for the proposition to
declare that the children of all parentage whatever, born in California,
should be regarded and treated as citizens of the United States, entitled to
equal civil rights with other citizens of the United States.96

As for the danger of Gypsy hordes, Conness noted that ―I have lived in
the United States for now many a year, and really I have heard more about
Gypsies within the last two or three months than I have heard before in my
life.‖97
The debate quickly turned to the real question that hung over the
―subject to the jurisdiction‖ language: the citizenship status of reservation
and ―wild‖ Indians. Here is where the advocates of a restrictive reading
incompletely quote Trumbull. The evidence is overwhelming that the
debate consisted of two strands—one made up of rhetorical points scored
by Cowan and fellow opponents, the other made up of genuine concerns by
supporters of the bill that it might inadvertently open citizenship to the
group of Native Americans still living beyond the American legal system.
The Indian question arose when Senator James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin
offered an amendment that would have added the words ―excluding Indians
not taxed‖ to the Clause. Doolittle, from a frontier state, told the Senate
that
I moved this amendment because it seems to me very clear that there is a
large mass of the Indian population who are clearly subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States who ought not to be included as citizens
of the United States. All the Indians upon reservations within the several
States are most clearly subject to our jurisdiction, both civil and
military. . . . For instance, there are seven or eight thousand Navajoes
[sic] at the moment under the control of General Carlton, in New
Mexico, upon the Indian reservations, managed, controlled, fed at the
expense of the United States, and fed by the War Department, managed
by the War Department, and at a cost to this Government of almost a
million and a half of dollars every year. . . . Are these six or seven
thousand Navajoes [sic] to be made citizens of the United States? Go
into the State of Kansas, and you find there any number of reservations,
Indians in all stages, from the wild Indian of the plains, who lives on
nothing but the meat of the buffalo, to those Indians who are partially

96. Id. (remarks of Sen. Conness).
97. Id. at 2892.
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civilized and have partially adopted the habits of civilized life. So it is in
other States. In my own state there are the Chippewas, the remnants of
the Winnebagoes, [sic] and the Pottawatomies. There are tribes in the
State of Minnesota and other States of the Union. Are these persons to
be regarded as citizens of the United States, and by a constitutional
amendment declared to be such, because they are born within the United
States and subject to our jurisdiction? . . . Take Colorado; there are more
Indian citizens of Colorado than there are white citizens this moment
[sic] if you admit it as a State.98

Doolittle pointed out that the Constitution as written in 1787 excluded
―Indians not taxed‖ from the enumeration of the people for purposes of
Congressional representation. His amendment, he suggested, would simply
make explicit that this exclusion applied to citizenship as well. At this
point, Senator Fessenden admitted that he was unsure about the effect of
the proposed language, and asked Senator Trumbull, ―who has investigated
the civil rights bill so thoroughly,‖ for his views.99
Here is where Trumbull gives his famous gloss on the words as meaning
―subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof.‖100 In this context, he is
discussing the question of the citizenship status of Native peoples in the
United States.
What do we mean by ―subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?‖
Not owing allegiance to anybody else. That is what it means. Can you
sue a Navajoe [sic] Indian in court? Are they in any sense subject to the
complete jurisdiction of the United States? By no means. We make
treaties with them, and therefore they are not subject to our jurisdiction.
If they were, we would not make treaties with them. If we want to
control the Navajoes, [sic] or any other Indians of which the Senator
from Wisconsin has spoken, how do we do it? Do we pass a law to
control them? Are they subject to our jurisdiction in that sense? Is it not
understood that if we want to make arrangements with the Indians to
whom he refers we do it by means of a treaty?101

But not all Indian people were settled on reservations or still ―wild.‖
Many lived within the normal bounds of non-reservation communities. ―If
they are there and within the jurisdiction of Colorado, and subject to the

98. Id. at 2892 (remarks of Sen. Doolittle).
99. Id. at 2893 (remarks of Sen. Fessenden). Note that Fessenden is not turning to
Trumbull as the author of the measure (he wasn‘t), nor does he say that the new language
means exactly what the different language of the Civil Rights Bill meant. He turns to
Trumbull because of his work on the question of citizenship. Trumbull himself immediately
said, ―Of course my opinion is not any better than that of any other member of the Senate.‖
Id. (remarks of Sen. Trumbull).
100. Id.
101. Id. (remarks of Sen. Trumbull) (emphasis added).
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laws of Colorado, they ought to be citizens; and that is all that is
proposed.‖102
The distinction implied by ―subject to the jurisdiction,‖ Trumbull said,
was that between Native people who lived under their own governments
and outside of the legal and social system of the United States on the one
hand and those who were settled in communities that were part of that
system.103 The ―excluding Indians not taxed‖ language had been included
in
the
Civil
Rights
Bill,
and
it
was
(as Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland now pointed out) included in
section two of the draft amendment (and of course in Article I of the
original Constitution).104 Trumbull replied that the language in section two
of the Amendment referred only to ―Indians not taxed‖ within the borders
of a state of the Union (since it pertained to apportionment of members of
the House, who can only come from a State); if introduced into section one,
it would ―refer[] to persons everywhere, whether in the States or in the
Territories or in the District of Columbia.‖105
If the ―not taxed‖ language were moved outside of its apportionment
context, Trumbull suggested, it might be read to refer to ―the fact of
taxation‖ rather than to ―describe a class of persons.‖106 If that happened,
―it would make of a wealthy Indian a citizen and would not make a citizen
of one not possessed of wealth under the same circumstances.‖107 Because
of that potential ambiguity, Trumbull said, ―the language proposed in this
constitutional amendment is better than the language in the civil rights
bill.‖108
That language was sufficient to exclude those Native bands not yet under
full national jurisdiction, he added:
They are not subject to our jurisdiction in the sense of owing allegiance
solely to the United States; and the Senator from Maryland, if he will
look into our statutes, will search in vain for any means of trying these
wild Indians. A person can only be tried for a criminal offense in
pursuance of laws, and he must be tried in a district which must have
been fixed by law before the crime was committed. We have had in this

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (―Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each state, excluding Indians not taxed.‖); see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (―Representatives
and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several states . . . according to their
respective Numbers . . . excluding Indians not taxed.‖)
105. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2894 (1866).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.

GARRETT EPPS 60.2

2010]

THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE

359

country and have to-day, a large region of country within the territorial
limits of the United States, unorganized, over which we do not pretend to
exercise any civil or criminal jurisdiction, where wild tribes of Indians
roam at pleasure, subject to their own laws and regulations, and we do
not pretend to interfere with them. They would not be embraced by this
provision.‖109

Senator Thomas Hendricks of Indiana, a Democrat who had been a
persistent foe of the Civil Rights Act, then suggested that Congress had the
legal authority, if it chose, to extend its laws to the ―wild Indians,‖ even if
it lacked the physical power to enforce them at present.110 Trumbull replied
rather tartly that Congress would have ―the same power that it has to extend
the laws of the United States over Mexico.‖111
Senator Jacob Howard, the Senate sponsor of the proposed constitutional
amendment, now weighed in:
I concur entirely with the honorable Senator from Illinois, in holding that
the word ‗jurisdiction,‘ as here employed, ought to be construed so as to
imply a full and complete jurisdiction on the part of the United States,
coextensive in all respects with the constitutional power of the United
States, whether exercised by Congress, by the executive, or by the
judicial department; that is to say, the same jurisdiction in extent and
quality as applies to every citizen of the United States now. Certainly,
gentlemen cannot contend that an Indian belonging to a tribe, although
born within the limits of a State, is subject to this full and complete
jurisdiction.
....
The United States courts have no power to punish an Indian who is
connected with a tribe for a crime committed by him upon another
member of the same tribe.112

After this, the ―Indians not taxed‖ language was rejected113 and the
debate moved on to the wording of the other sections of the draft
amendment.
Here we have a preliminary ―legislative history‖ of the Citizenship
Clause. Unlike the rest of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, none
of this history takes place in committee, where a full record was not kept.114
What do we conclude from it in relation to the ―intent‖ of its Framers about
109. Id.
110. Id. (remarks of Sen. Hendricks).
111. Id. (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). Senator Fessenden in fact insisted that Congress
could do that as well if it chose. Id. (remarks of Sen. Fessenden).
112. Id. at 2895 (remarks of Sen. Howard).
113. Id. at 2897.
114. The Clause was first drawn up in a Republican caucus, and we have no record of its
deliberations.
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the application of the Clause to citizens born to alien parents present in the
United States?
One is first struck by the applicability of the earliest colloquy to this
precise question. Remember that Dean Eastman, at least, would construe
the Clause to deny citizenship to Yasser Esam Hamdi and other children
born to alien parents legally but temporarily resident in the United States.115
Those parents, I suggest, are in precisely the same position as were the
Chinese nationals resident in California, who were allowed in for purposes
of labor—and were thus present legally—but who were ineligible for
citizenship on grounds of race. Their children, the debate makes clear,
would, under the proponents‘ interpretation, be natural-born citizens under
the Clause. The implication for Hamdi and others like him, as a matter of
―original intent‖ is clear; it is the opposite of the ―clear intent‖
restrictionists discern.
Second, the discussion of Gypsies provides about the closest thing we
are likely to get to the issue of illegal immigration. Recall that at this time
there was no federal category of illegal immigrant. But Lou Dobbs could
not describe with greater disapproval the characteristics of an ―illegal‖
population within United States borders—inassimilable, defiant, criminal,
nomadic, ungovernable—than the description given by Senator Cowan of
the Gypsy population of his state. The proponents of the amendment, on
the evidence of the record, gave an unqualified affirmation of the
citizenship of American-born Gypsy children. If we are disposed to infer
intent analogically, I would suggest that the evidence more readily supports
the broad reading of the Clause than the restrictive one.
The language relied upon by advocates of a restrictive reading was
uttered entirely within the context of citizenship of tribal Indians. The
language about ―full and complete jurisdiction‖ refers to the legal
immunities of these Indians, not in any way to immigrant populations
within the United States. And the definition that the proponents offer of
that ―full and complete‖ jurisdiction is a practical one, owing little to
notions of ―ascription‖ or ―consent.‖ A person, Trumbull and Howard said,
is subject to the jurisdiction if he or she can be summoned by and sued in
an American court or if he or she can be prosecuted criminally for actions
taking place on United States soil.116 ―Wild‖ and reservation Indians had,
in essence, a limited extraterritoriality while on their own territory, even
though it was within the borders of the nation; they were, in Senator

115. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 101, 112 and accompanying text.
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Trumbull‘s analogy, like Mexicans living in Mexico.117 There was,
however, no racial or national-origin component to this exception—as
Trumbull said, Indians born in Colorado and living in its borders as
ordinary Coloradoans ought to be and would be citizens under the
Clause.118
The analogous question, therefore, ought to be the following: If an
―illegal alien,‖ or the American-born child of such an alien, commits a civil
wrong—involvement in an automobile accident, say—on United States
soil, can he or she be sued? If such a person commits a crime on United
States soil, can he or she be tried and punished? The answers to these
questions are self-evident. The only aliens who are immune from this civil
and criminal jurisdiction are those who come here under explicit grants of
diplomatic immunity—that is, the precise ―public ministers‖ (and their
children) whom Senator Howard, by any natural reading of his remarks on
introducing the clause, indicated as the sole exceptions to its declaration.
If, then, it was the ―clear intent‖ of the Framers that children of aliens
not be covered by the clause, it seems reasonable to ask what would
possibly be an unclear intent. The process of unearthing this putative
―clear intent‖ calls to mind the remark attributed to Winston Churchill upon
his defeat for re-election as Prime Minister in 1945. Churchill‘s wife
suggested that the defeat might be ―a blessing in disguise.‖119 ―At the
moment,‖ he replied, ―it seems quite effectively disguised.‖120
III. TRAVELS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Many of the men (and they were all men)121 who actually framed the
Fourteenth Amendment were highly accomplished lawyers. Lyman
Trumbull, in particular, was one of the more accomplished appellate
advocates of the Illinois bar,122 and William P. Fessenden, chair of the Joint
Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, was among the small elite

117. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
119. DAVID REYNOLDS, IN COMMAND OF HISTORY: CHURCHILL FIGHTING AND WRITING
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 5 (2005).
120. Id.
121. One of the most poignant aspects of reading accounts of the Thirty-Ninth Congress‘
translation of the ideals of the anti-slavery and Abolitionist movements into constitutional
text is the alacrity with which these practical men abandoned the important thread of antislavery thought that challenged the legal and social subordination of women. See EPPS,
DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 205–21.
122. See id. at 126; RALPH J. ROSKE, HIS OWN COUNSEL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LYMAN
TRUMBULL 3 (1979) (describing Trumbull as a powerful and successful debater); MARK M.
KRUG, LYMAN TRUMBULL: CONSERVATIVE RADICAL 24–28 (1965) (referring to Trumbull‘s
reputation as an excellent and logical debater who prepared his cases with extreme care).
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Supreme Court bar of his time.123 Jacob Howard had been attorney general
of Michigan124—at that time a frontier state in which Indian relations were
quite important. Benjamin Wade had been both a county prosecutor125 and
a state judge126 before ascending to the Senate. When we hear these men
debate jurisdictional issues, we are not listening to a theoretical debate
about jurisdiction, sovereignty, and the theories of Grotius and Vattel, but
the concerns of practical men about highly developed doctrines in
American domestic law. As the foregoing debate illustrates, foremost in
the minds of these Framers was the question of how the Citizenship Clause
would affect the legal status of American Indians both within and without
what was then called ―Indian country.‖ We must be careful not to allow
legal concepts of Indian status current in the twenty-first century to mislead
us into believing that Indian law at the time was analogous to Indian law
today.
The discussion of ―subject to the jurisdiction‖ in the Citizenship Clause
began as a discussion of whether it was an adequate substitute for ―Indians
not taxed,‖ the phrase used in Article I of the Constitution to exclude
Indians from congressional apportionment and in the Civil Rights Bill to
indicate all those covered by that bill‘s citizenship provision. From 1789
until 1868, according to a standard work in the field,
[o]nly those few Indians who had severed their tribal relations and
individually joined non-Indian communities were considered to be
subject to ordinary laws in a manner that made it appropriate to count
them in the apportionment of direct federal taxes or for representation in
Congress.
....
[T]he phrase ―Indians not taxed‖ was not a grant of tax exemption; it
described an existing status.‖127

Indians who had not severed their ties with their tribes lived in ―Indian
country.‖ This phrase was not a general description but a term of art
carefully defined by statute128 as
123. Fessenden, a godson and legal associate of Daniel Webster, argued eight cases in
front of the United States Supreme Court before and during his Senate service, including
most notably Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
124. 2 WILLIAM HORATIO BARNES, THE FORTIETH CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL 16 (1870).
125. See ALBERT GALLATIN RIDDLE, THE LIFE OF BENJAMIN F. WADE 89 (1888).
126. Id. at 109.
127. FELIX S. COHEN‘S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 388–89 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., The Michie Company 1982) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter COHEN‘S
HANDBOOK].
128. See Trade and Non-Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161 (1834) (in effect in 1866). The
definition of ―Indian Country‖ in contemporary federal law, though much changed from
what it was during the Treaty era, is directly descended from the definition of the Act. See
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all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within
the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and,
also, that part of the United States east of the Mississippi River, and not
within any state, to which the Indian title has not been extinguished[.]129

Indians dwelling within ―Indian country‖ were ―considered to be
members of separate political communities and not part of the ordinary
body politic of the states or of the United States.‖130
The existence of ―Indian country‖ had profound legal implications for
the jurisdiction of state and federal governments, courts, and lawenforcement agencies. As the standard Indian law reference says,
―[f]ederal policy from the beginning recognized and protected separate
status for tribal Indians in their own territory.‖131 In 1866, Indian relations
were still largely governed by treaties between individual tribes and the
United States, which treated the tribes as quasi-sovereign and accorded
tribal members something much like extraterritoriality.132 For example,
whites could not enter or remain on reservations without permission of the
United States, buy weapons or hunting items from, or sell them to, tribal
Indians, or purchase or lease lands from tribal Indians without federal
permission.133 Foreigners needed both a valid passport and federal
permission to enter Indian country and were subject to removal if found to
be attempting to conduct negotiations with tribal governments. 134 If tribal
Indians stole the horses or property of whites—whether the depredation
occurred on or off the reservation—the aggrieved party had no recourse
against the thieves but had to apply to the United States to conduct
diplomatic proceedings with the tribe to obtain recompense and persuade
the tribe to punish the thieves.135 If negotiations failed, the victim would be
compensated by the United States, which might then conduct military
operations against the tribe and apprehend and punish the raiders.136
Finally, federal criminal statutes governing exclusive federal territory were
in force within Indian country but did ―not extend to crimes committed by
one Indian against the person or property of another Indian.‖137
COHEN‘S HANDBOOK, supra note 127, at 31.
129. Trade and Non-Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161.
130. COHEN‘S HANDBOOK, supra note 127, at 641 (footnote omitted).
131. Id. at 28 (footnote omitted).
132. Congress by statute ended the president‘s discretion to enter into formal treaties
with tribes only in 1871. COHEN‘S HANDBOOK, supra note 127, at 107.
133. Id. at 70, 76, 110.
134. Id. at 72, 112, 116.
135. Id. at 112, 117.
136. Id. at 112.
137. Trade and Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 161 (1834). This remained good law, see Ex
Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-oa (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883), until the passage of the Major
Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 385 (1885).
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Relations with Indians in ―Indian country‖ were, in 1866, governed as
foreign affairs, subject to the Treaty Power. Treaties frequently recognized
the sovereignty of Indian tribes, but numerous treaty provisions also
attested to their status as dependent nations.138 The fact that much of the
early relationship between Indians and federal and state governments
revolved around treaties illustrates that, at least in the first century of the
United States‘ existence, ―Indian affairs were more an aspect of military
and foreign policy, than a subject of domestic or municipal law.‖139 In fact,
the administration of Indian affairs was originally assigned to the
Department of War.140 It was not until fifty years later that ―all the acts of
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs [of the War Department]‖ were
officially moved to the newly formed Department of the Interior.141
The confusion over the quasi-sovereign character of tribes also extended
to the citizenship status of individual Indians.142 Indians typically did not
acquire citizenship simply by being born within the territory of the United
States.143 Moreover, prior to the Civil War, ―[n]ative Americans were
considered to be members of an alien, uncivilized race, whose values were
antithetical to those of the dominant white civilization.‖144 Chief Justice
Marshall provided a foundation for denying citizenship to Indians in
Worcester v. Georgia.145 The opinion implied that Native Americans who
remained under the authority of tribal governments were citizens of those
tribes rather than of the United States.146 Professor Earl Maltz has
suggested that Indians ―were not even appropriately considered part of the
people of the United States, let alone citizens.‖147 As a result of these
important legal decisions on the tribes‘ quasi-sovereign status, Indians
would continue to be excluded from American citizenship.148
Ten years after Worcester, Chief Justice Taney retreated from Marshall‘s
theory of Indian citizenship status in United States v. Rogers.149 In the
opinion, ―Taney seemed to reject the proposition that tribal government

138. COHEN‘S HANDBOOK, supra note 127, at 393.
139. Id. at 393–94 (footnote omitted).
140. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7 § 1, 1 Stat. 49.
141. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108 § 5, 9 Stat. 395.
142. JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870,
296–97 (1978).
143. Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment and Native American Citizenship, 22
IMMIGR. & NAT‘LITY L. REV. 625, 630 (2001).
144. Id. at 626.
145. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
146. Id.
147. Maltz, supra note 143, at 627.
148. KETTNER, supra note 142, at 300.
149. 45 U.S. 567 (4 How.) (1846).
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possessed any residual characteristics of sovereignty.‖150 While under
Taney‘s analysis Indians were still not considered citizens, ―they were
nonetheless to be considered subjects of the government of the United
States.‖151 Many Native Americans had no desire whatsoever to become a
part of and be subject to the rules of white society.152 For those who did,
naturalization was the only option, and opportunities for naturalization
were few.153 In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney had supplemented his
remarks on the ineligibility of black people for citizenship by remarking
that Indians were not citizens by virtue of the Constitution but that
Congress could, if it chose, make them citizens by using its naturalization
power.154
However, ―a number of treaties and statutes contemplated the possibility
of Indian citizenship under certain conditions.‖155 Specifically, the
Cherokee treaties of 1817 and 1819 provided that an Indian who left his
tribe and received a land allotment in fee simple could thereby become a
naturalized citizen.156 However, the offer of citizenship often appeared to
be more of a threat than a reward.157 During the Indian Removal dispute,
the federal government told the Cherokee that if they did not
―denationalize‖ and become landholding citizens—thereby giving up their
highly developed culture—their only alternative was removal west of the
Mississippi River.158 In the years following, similar treaties were

150. Maltz, supra note 143, at 627–28.
151. Id. at 628.
152. Id. at 626.
153. See id. at 630 (noting that Native Americans were generally ineligible for
naturalization under the terms of the naturalization statutes).
154. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856). Taney explained:
It is true that the course of events has brought the Indian tribes within
the limits of the United States under subjection to the white race; and it
has been found necessary, for their sake as well as our own, to regard
them as in a state of pupilage, and to legislate to a certain extent over
them and the territory they occupy. But they may, without doubt, like
the subjects of any other foreign Government, be naturalized by the
authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the United
States; and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up
his abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all the
rights and privileges which would belong to an emigrant from any other
foreign people.
Id.
155. KETTNER, supra note 142, at 291–92.
156. See Treaty with the Cherokees, U.S.-Cherokees, art. 8, July 8, 1817, 7 Stat. 156,
159; Treaty with the Cherokees, U.S.-Cherokees, art. 2, Feb. 27, 1819, 7 Stat. 195, 196.
157. See William G. McLoughlin, Experiment in Cherokee Citizenship, 1817–29, 33 AM.
Q. 3, 4 (1981) (noting that the threats resulted from the government‘s program of requiring
all Indians east of the Mississippi either to accept removal or to give up their Indian
identity).
158. Id.
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established between other tribes, often with individual Indians choosing
between tribal membership (and removal), on the one hand, and American
citizenship on the other.159
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, both state and federal
courts sustained the general view that individual Indians born within tribal
society did not qualify as citizens by birth.160 This lack of citizenship had a
significant effect on their ability to convey and inherit real property.161 In
1823, for example, the New York Court of Errors overturned a lower
court‘s decision that an Oneida Indian could inherit property as a citizen of
the State of New York.162 In deciding that the Indian was not a citizen,
Chancellor James Kent observed: ―Though born within our territorial
limits, the Indians are considered as born under the dominion of their
tribes. They are not our subjects, born within the purview of the law,
because they are not born in obedience to us.‖163 In a similar case a few
years later, the South Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the citizenship
and voting ability of an Indian who had served in the Continental army.164
Although Marsh was a man of ―excellent character,‖ the judge held ―with
regret‖ that he was a citizen belonging to that ―race of people, who have
always been considered as a separate and distinct class, never having been
incorporated into the body politic.‖165
Even when a state purchased land from an individual Indian, the
conveyance was often held void under state law. Lee v. Glover166 firmly
established that even in the event that an Indian was granted lands by the
state as a reward for military services, ―by the constitution and statute law
of [the State of New York], no white person [could] purchase any title to
land, from any one or more Indians, either individually or collectively,
without the authority and consent of the legislature.‖167
In criminal matters, as one Indian scholar has noted, the trend during the
years before the Civil War ―was away from a land sovereignty notion of
jurisdiction and toward a concept based primarily on the citizenship of the
parties.‖168 The limits on the reach of courts into Indian country were

159. KETTNER, supra note 142, at 292–93.
160. Id. at 294.
161. Id.
162. See Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. Rep. 693, 734 (N.Y. 1823).
163. Id. at 712.
164. See State ex rel. Marsh v. Managers of Elections, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 215, 216 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1829); see also KETTNER, supra note 142, at 294–95.
165. Marsh, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) at 216.
166. 8 Cow. 189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828) ) (per curia).
167. Id. at 190.
168. Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The
Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951, 955 (1975).

GARRETT EPPS 60.2

2010]

THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE

367

based on the idea, present in federal Indian law since Chief Justice
Marshall‘s opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,169 that Indian tribes
were not subjects of state authority but ―domestic dependent nations‖ that
retained important aspects of sovereignty and could in a limited way
continue to deal with the United States on a state-to-state basis.170
State law had no reach within Indian Country in 1866.171 That doctrine
did not begin to erode, even for criminal matters, until at least 1881, with
the Supreme Court‘s decision in United States v. McBratney.172 It was not
until the Termination Era of the 1950s that Congress by statute extended
state jurisdiction over Indian reservations—and even then, some
reservations were exempted.173 As for civil jurisdiction, the question was at
least equally muddled.174 Even in modern times, as one scholar noted a

169. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
170. Id. at 17.
171. William C. Canby, Jr., Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH L.
REV. 206, 207–08 (1973).
172. 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (holding that although the federal court did not have
jurisdiction over a white man accused of murdering another white man on Indian territory,
the federal authorities were required to turn the accused over to state authorities for
prosecution).
173. See Pub. L. No. 280-505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1953)); see
also Canby, supra note 171, at 211 (arguing that jurisdiction of tribal courts should be
determined based on the subject matter of the case and reservation affairs rather than the
race of the suing party).
174. In addition to lack of citizenship and land rights, a brief discussion of criminal
liability of Indians and criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands is also warranted in
establishing the legal status of Indians during this time period. See generally Clinton, supra
note 168. Treaties from 1778 to approximately 1796 generally resolved the issue of
criminal jurisdiction ―through reliance on the Indians‘ sovereignty . . . as well as through
negotiated arrangements predicated upon the citizenship of the defendant or victim.‖ Id. at
953. However, the Treaty of January 9, 1789, also referred to as the Treaty of Fort Harmar,
marked the beginning of the intrusion of United States jurisdiction into Indian sovereignty.
See Treaty with the Wyandots, Delawares, Ottawas, Chippewas, Pattawatimas, and Sacs,
Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 28. This treaty contained language that permitted territorial and state
governments to prosecute Indians who committed the crimes of robbery and murder against
non-Indians, regardless of whether the crime was committed in Indian territory. Id. art. V.
The following years witnessed a rapid decrease in Indian sovereignty over criminal
matters. Clinton, supra note 168, at 955. By the mid-1820s, provisions granting tribes
criminal jurisdiction had all but disappeared. Id. Moreover, federal jurisdiction, which had
previously been limited to situations where the victim was a U.S. citizen, ―was now
extended to cases in which either the perpetrator or the victim was a citizen or resident of
the United States.‖ Id. Thirty years later, the Cherokees agreed to the establishment of a
federal district court in Indian country. Id. at 956 (citing Treaty with the Cherokees art. VII,
U.S.-Cherokees, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799, 800–01 (stipulating that until a federal court
was created, the closest federal court to the reservation would have jurisdiction). However,
the Cherokees insisted that the treaty include a proviso ensuring that they could retain
exclusive jurisdiction of ―all civil and criminal cases arising within their country in which
members of the nation, by nativity or adoption, shall be the only parties.‖ Treaty with the
Cherokees art. VII, U.S.-Cherokees, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799, 803; see also Clinton,
supra note 168, at 956–57.
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century after the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, ―[n]early every
problem of Indian law has at its core a jurisdictional dispute.‖175
In short, tribal Indians were a large population resident within United
States territory. Over-expansive draftsmanship of the Citizenship Clause
would have had the unintended effect of making all of them United States
citizens, voiding numerous treaties and presenting federal courts and law
enforcement officials with all-but-insuperable problems of adjudication and
enforcement. It should hardly be surprising, then, that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment would include language omitting them from the
declaratory language of the Clause.
Of course, the Framers could have simply used the ―Indians not taxed‖
language. However, there was one more category of persons inside the
United States who did not acquire citizenship by birth. Children born to
accredited diplomatic personnel, by treaty and by customary international
law, are not ―subject to the jurisdiction‖ of the receiving state and do not by
birth become citizens of the United States. Neither they nor their parents
can be sued in civil court, state or federal, for individual torts; nor, except
in extraordinary cases, can they be arrested or tried for alleged crimes in
American courts.
It hardly seems coincidental that this class of children is the one that
everyone agrees the Framers were discussing prior to the segue into the
discussion of Indians. In 1866, tribal Indians had some of the same
characteristics of diplomats. Their off-reservation raids (like crimes or
torts committed by diplomatic personnel or families) did not subject them
to arrest by state authorities, and were in the first instance matters of direct
government-to-government diplomatic negotiation. They had a sharply
limited capacity to enter into contracts, buy and sell property, or sue or be
sued in court. Unlike diplomatic personnel, however, tribal Indians were
and had been since Cherokee Nation v. Georgia considered to be resident
on American soil and under the national authority of the United States in
external matters.
Many thinkers believed in 1866 that the United States could, if it chose,
extinguish all remnants of Indian sovereignty and reduce tribal Indians to
the status of subjects of both state and federal jurisdiction. But it had not
done so. The reasons are many, but surely foremost among them was that
the Indians themselves were in a position to offer violent and effectual
military resistance to such a move, even against the military behemoth the
United States had become. In 1866, the debacle at Little Big Horn was still
a decade away. The last battle of the Indian Wars did not take place until
175. Canby, supra note 171, at 206.
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1918. American jurisdiction over Indian country might be complete on the
international plane; but domestically it seemed shaky indeed. Tribal
Indians occupied thus a much different position than did, say, Chinese
living in California.
If, as I contend, the phrase ―full and complete jurisdiction‖ draws its
meaning from the context of tribal Indians, it means something
considerably different than mere dual nationality of parentage, which is the
meaning that advocates of a restrictive reading claim to discern in it. Can
―illegal aliens‖ be arrested, tried, and even executed? Can ―illegal aliens‖
buy and sell property? Can they make contracts and incur liability for
breach? Can they be sued in tort if they, for example, drive unsafely and
injure or kill other motorists? The answer to these questions is clear. In
short, ―illegal aliens‖ in the twenty-first century have no similarity to tribal
Indians in the nineteenth. Their children (unlike the children of tribal
Indians) do not have, as a matter of American law, another nation upon
whose protection they may call. Unlike tribal Indians, they are not
guaranteed membership in any community other than the one into which
they are born.
Proponents of restriction, however, find one flaw in these newborns.
Not in themselves, actually, but in their parents, who are either lawbreakers
or at the very least undesirables. ―Blame the parents,‖ Arizona State
Senator Russell Pearce said recently. ―They‘re breaking the law, and you
can‘t reward them.‖176 But in terms of defining an innocent person‘s legal
capacity, it is difficult to see what relevance the status of their parents has.
It may be true that the United States has ―tried‖ to exclude the parents from
the community by ―discouraging‖ their entry.177 But the children have
committed no crime at birth; have violated no law; have not transgressed
the implied promise of a visa.
To punish babies, much less to proscribe and entirely outlaw them,
because of the perceived sins of their parents is alien to our moral and
ethical tradition. Guilt is not hereditary; it is individual.178 We do not

176. Scott Wong, Arizona State Sen. Russell Pearce
Targets
Immigrants‘
Kids,
POLITICO,
(Aug.
4,
2010),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0810/40675.html.
177. I use the quotation marks because there is a compelling case to be made that,
because the American economy depends on their labor, efforts to exclude or discourage
―illegal aliens‖ are in fact ineffectual by design.
178. The principle that guilt is not hereditary is a foundational principle of the Western
moral-legal tradition:
Yet say ye, Why? doth not the son bear the iniquity of the father? When
the son hath done that which is lawful and right, and hath kept all my
statutes, and hath done them, he shall surely live. The soul that sinneth,
it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall
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impose legal disabilities on the children of felons, for example, no matter
how heinous their parents‘ actions. The conscience revolts at the idea, and
the Constitution itself rejects ancestral guilt as a basis for policy. However
much we dislike undocumented aliens, they are surely not worse than
traitors, those who ―levy[] [w]ar against [the United States,‖ or ―adher[e] to
their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.‖179 And yet, even with the
example of Benedict Arnold fresh in their minds, the Framers of the
Constitution protected the children of these renegades from eating their
parents‘ sour grapes: ―[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.‖180
To argue that American-born children are in some way not ―subject to
the jurisdiction‖ of the United States is not to argue that they benefit in
some way from the immunities of extraterritoriality; it is to argue that they
suffer all the liabilities of citizenship but are, because of actions of a third
party, to be deprived of its advantages. Does it seem likely that the antislavery thinkers who devised the Citizenship Clause as a means of
overruling Dred Scott intended at the same time to create a new class of
persons who had no rights a citizen is bound to respect?
IV. THE INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY
REPUBLICAN CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship Without Consent centers around a sophisticated reading of
such Enlightenment figures as John Locke, Emmerich de Vatel, JeanJacques Rousseau, and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui. The thought of these
figures, as ably construed by the authors, gives substance to their
contention that
birthright citizenship is something of a bastard concept in American
ideology. For all its appealing simplicity, it remains a puzzling idea. . . .
[I]t was fundamentally opposed to the consensual assumptions that
guided the political handiwork of 1776 and 1787. In a polity whose
chief organizing principle was and is the liberal, individualistic idea of
consent, mere birth within a nation‘s border seems to be an anomalous,
inadequate measure or expression of an individual‘s consent to its rule
and a decidedly crude indicator of the nation‘s consent to the
individual‘s admission to political membership.181
the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righteous
shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.
Ezekiel 18:19–20 (King James).
179. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. I thank Professor Laurence Claus of the University
of San Diego for pointing this out to me.
180. Id. cl. 2.
181. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 2–3.
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This analysis is admirable. But as it says, it applies the intellectual
concepts of ―1776 and 1787‖ to construe a constitutional amendment
written in 1866. It implicitly assumes that the American conception of
citizenship underwent no changes during eight decades of convulsive
political struggle that culminated in a catastrophic Civil War and a
constitutional revolution. And the elegant references to Burlamaqui and
Vattel disguise the absence of any parsing of the more immediate
intellectual background of the Amendment.
In fact, the index to Citizenship Without Consent contains no entries for
the more relevant figures. Not only is there no reference to important
nineteenth-century figures like Wendell Phillips, Francis Lieber, Edward
Bates, Robert Dale Owen and Carl Schurz; there is no mention even of
some of the immediate legislative forebears of the Fourteenth Amendment
generally and the Citizenship Clause generally—names like John Bingham,
Thaddeus Stevens, William P. Fessenden, and Benjamin Wade. Even those
who are mentioned—figures like Senator Lyman Trumbull and Jacob
Howard—are quoted only as to their remarks in the legislative debates,
with no attempt to place their remarks in the context of their own thought
or of the debate of their times. In short, without seeming to notice, the
authors (and those whose interpretations depend on their work) make two
fundamental interpretive errors. First, they insist on interpreting a
nineteenth-century enactment exclusively in terms of eighteenth-century
ideas; second, they treat an amendment to the Constitution, written in a
time of revolutionary upheaval, as if it made either no change or at most
only minimal change in the document it was amending. The result is an
ahistorical and perverse reading of phrases whose meaning becomes far
clearer when considered in their actual context.182
182. In his subsequent intellectual history of American citizenship, Professor Smith
notes that ―[m]any have objected to our argument [in Citizenship Without Consent], and
some of the objections have force.‖ ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 309 (1997). Nonetheless, he argues that permitting
citizenship only to children of aliens lawfully present in the United States ―produces the
main results most framers endorsed: constitutional inclusion for blacks and permanent
resident aliens like the Chinese, but no such inclusion for the tribes.‖ Id. This argument is
of a type that appears in some ―originalist‖ writings from at least the time of Dred Scott.
Since we know what the Framers were thinking, it suggests, we can interpret their words to
mean what they were thinking rather than what they said. The language of the Clause does
not support a limitation to ―blacks and resident aliens.‖ Professor Smith explains the
language by interpreting the legislative debates to say that Trumbull and Howard ―stress[ed]
that the clause implicitly required ‗full and complete‘ jurisdiction. Insofar as they clarified
what that meant, however, they identified it with a lack of any divided political allegiance.‖
Id. This summary flatly mischaracterizes what was said. Trumbull and Howard did clarify
what they meant: full subjection to the jurisdiction of United States courts.
The phrase ―[i]nsofar as they clarified what that meant‖ is of a type that often
appears in ―originalist‖ writings. It has a good deal of utility as a means of discounting
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Simply put, both American legal history and the intellectual history of
the antislavery movement produced a rich body of material reformulating
the idea of American citizenship—one that makes an inclusive reading of
the Clause much more plausible and a restrictive one anomalous. In the
area of legal history, another comprehensive survey of antebellum
citizenship law concludes that birthright citizenship was the legal norm in
American law during the first half of the nineteenth century.183 While
Schuck and Smith suggest that American law was ambivalent between
―ascriptive‖ (birthright) citizenship and a consensual model, James H.
Kettner concludes that birthright citizenship was an unquestioned principle
of American law until the slavery controversy drove pro-slavery jurists to
construct an alternative model of citizenship that could exclude Americanborn black people on the ground that the polity did not ―consent‖ to their
membership.184 Before 1820, he writes,
Americans merely continued to assume that ―birth within the allegiance‖
conferred [citizenship] and its accompanying rights. Natives were
presumably educated from infancy in the values and habits necessary for
self-government, and there was no need to worry about their
qualifications for membership. To be sure, it might trouble some that the
volitional, consensual character of birthright citizenship was in fact more
theoretical than real owing to the lack of concrete legislation regulating
the abstract right of expatriation; but this concern only led to agitation
for laws that would allow citizens to withdraw from membership. It did
not shake the presumption that membership was acquired automatically
by all those born under the Republic.185

As late as 1838, for example, one North Carolina court wrote that a freed
slave must be a citizen, because ―[s]laves manumitted here became
freemen—and therefore if born within North Carolina are citizens of North
Carolina—and all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the
State.‖186 In Kettner‘s account, the rule of citizenship by birth was the
orthodox legal view. The sustained critique of birthright citizenship was
the novel doctrine. Kettner writes that it was advanced by state courts and
lawyers anxious to justify and legalize the removal and exclusion of Native

adverse authority gleaned from the statements of the very framers a conscientious
―originalist‖ purports to be following. It is akin to the suggestion that seemingly clear text
must be unclear. The framers, it turned out, were confused. They did not really know what
they were ―intending.‖ Thus subsequent scholars, who understand theory better, can by a
kind of substituted judgment create their actual intent, whether they would have claimed it
or not.
183. See KETTNER, supra note 142, at 287.
184. Id. at 287–88.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 317 (quoting State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (4 Dev. & Bat.) 20, 25 (1838)).
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Americans and the permanent subordination of slaves and free blacks.187
That effort at doctrinal change bore fruit in the Supreme Court‘s decision in
Scott v. Sandford, a decision that was seen as extreme at the time and takes
little account of the weight of legal authority that favored birthright
citizenship.
In fact, many American lawyers and lawmakers would have seen the
Citizenship Clause as merely a declaration of what the law already was.
Schuck and Smith seem to be interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as if
it had been written as a slight modification of cases like Dred Scott, rather
than being designed to overturn them. It is as if interpreters were to read
the United States Constitution as in some way a reaffirmation of the British
Constitution, ―intended‖ to make only minimal changes in British
sovereignty over North America and the absolute sovereignty of
Parliament. The Fourteenth Amendment is an amendment. A contextual
history of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that it was
intended as a wide-ranging and fundamental change in the 1787
Constitution, not as a minor technical change leaving core concepts
unchanged.
As noted above, my research to date has focused on the political ideas
and debate immediately surrounding the adoption of the Amendment.
Excellent scholars have delved more deeply than I into the general
intellectual history of anti-slavery ideas during the forty years preceding
the Civil War.188 Even a cursory dip into their work and the documentary
sources surrounding it produces God‘s plenty of evidence that, by 1865, the
idea of citizenship had undergone a radical shift from the half-hearted,
state-centered view enshrined in the original Constitution.
Jacobus tenBroek, one of the pioneers of modern Fourteenth
Amendment scholarship, sets out his thesis early in his book Equal Under
Law: ―In some ways doctrinally and perhaps historically the most
significant contribution made by the abolitionists in the constitutional
development of the United States was their conception of paramount

187. KETTNER, supra note 142, at 288.
188. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986)(arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment manifested their intent that the states were required to respect individual
liberties in the privileges and immunities clause); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988)(discussing the
philosophical development and academic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment from
the time of adoption to present day); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (Collier
Books 1965) (1951), originally published as THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (examining the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment and debate
surrounding it to prove that a broad protection of civil rights was what the drafters
intended).
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national citizenship.‖189 This ―paramount‖ notion took the idea of
citizenship firmly out of the hands of the states. An American citizen,
whether ―natural born‖ or naturalized, was a citizen of the United States;
citizenship arose out of the nation, under the Constitution, rather than as a
derivative boon arising out of state citizenship. The paramount idea was
also strikingly inclusive. It regarded birth itself as sufficient for
citizenship, and saw membership in the American family as a right of the
child‘s quite independent of the qualities of his or her parents.
tenBroek cites Lysander Spooner and Joel Tiffany as the ―principal
spokesmen and most articulate exponents of the theory of paramount
national citizenship.‖190 Spooner‘s 1845 tract, The Unconstitutionality of
Slavery,191 is concerned to prove that the guarantees of liberty in the
Constitution applied to those then held as slaves: ―The constitution [sic] of
the United States recognizes the principle that all men are born free; for it
recognizes the principle that natural birth in the country gives citizenship—
which of course implies freedom. And no exception is made to the rule.‖192
Spooner further argues that in American usage since the Revolution, the
word ―free person‖ and ―citizen‖ are synonymous. Being born free,
Spooner argued, those held as slaves are citizens by birth, regardless of any
reluctance on the part of slave states to acknowledge their membership in
the political community. (Note that this argument for slave citizenship
antedates the Supreme Court‘s decision in Dred Scott, and thus can hardly
be regarded as an ad hoc response to it.)
The basic argument for slave citizenship arises out of the Constitution‘s
requirement that any individual elected President must be ―a natural born
citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.‖193 This language, Spooner says,
is an implied assertion that natural birth in the country gives the right of
citizenship. And if it gives it to one, it necessarily gives it to all—for no
discrimination is made; and if all persons born in the country, are not
entitled to citizenship, the constitution has given us no test by which to
determine who of them are entitled to it.194

Spooner then confronts directly the eighteenth-century argument, carried
on by Schuck and Smith, that mere birth slights the requirement of consent:

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

TENBROEK,

supra note 188, at 94.
Id. at 108.
LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1845).
Id. at 156 (footnote omitted).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
SPOONER, supra note 191, at 119.
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It may, perhaps, be argued that the slaves were not parties to the
constitution, inasmuch as they never, in fact, consented to it. But this
reasoning would disfranchise half the population; for there is not a single
constitution in the country—state, or national—to which one half of the
people who are, in theory, parties to it, ever, in fact and in form, agreed.
Voting for and under a constitution, are almost the only acts that can,
with any reason at all, be considered a formal assent to a constitution.
Yet a bare majority of the adult males, or about one tenth of the whole
people, is the largest number of ―the people― that has ever been
considered necessary, in this country, to establish a constitution. And
after it is established, only about one fifth of the people are allowed to
vote under it, even where suffrage is most extended. So that no formal
assent to a constitution is ever given by the people at large. Yet the
constitutions themselves assume, and virtually assert, that all ―the
people― have agreed to them. They must, therefore, be construed on the
theory that all have agreed to them, else the instruments themselves are
at once denied, and, of course, invalidated altogether. No one, then, who
upholds the validity of the constitution, can deny its own assertion, that
all ―the people― are parties to it.
....
The consent, then, of ―the people― at large is presumed, whether they
ever have really consented, or not. Their consent is presumed only on
the assumption that the rights of citizenship are valuable and beneficial
to them, and that if they understood that fact, they would willingly give
their consent in form.195

Joel Tiffany, in his A Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of American
Slavery,196 asserted that persons of African descent born in the United
States were in fact citizens even though their parents, brought here as
slaves after the Revolution, were not eligible for naturalization; the fact of
birth in the United States was enough. His analysis specifically sets out a
definition for determining when a child is ―subject to a foreign power,‖ a
phrase that is crucial to the ―originalist‖ argument. The Naturalization Act,
he writes
does not exclude from the benefits of citizenship those colored persons
who, prior to [its passage] had ceased to be aliens either to the National
or State Governments. Neither does it affect the rights of those who
were born within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government and who
consequently, never were aliens, and stand in no need of naturalization;
195. LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 184–85 (enlarged ed.
1860) (1845).
196. JOEL TIFFANY, TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY:
TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO
THAT SUBJECT (Mnemosyne Publishing Co. 1969) (1849).
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and inasmuch as all are citizens or natural born subjects, who are not
aliens, hence all colored persons, who are born in the United States,
whether their parents are citizens or aliens, become citizens by birth; and
there is no Constitutional power any where, to declare or treat them as
aliens. They are not born under the protection of any foreign power, and
they owe no allegience [sic] to any; consequently they cannot be
required to take any oath of renunciation of allegience [sic].197

As tenBroek suggests, these theories arising out of the anti-slavery
movement had an influence on practical politicians as well as on political
activists.
tenBroek himself appends a lengthy 1857 speech by
Representative John Bingham, who a decade later was one of the most
important forces in the drafting and adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Bingham speech is important because it makes clear that
the anti-slavery idea of birthright citizenship was not a wooly rhetorical
notion. Bingham, an accomplished lawyer, in fact is delivering his view of
birthright citizenship within the context of an extremely restrictive view of
the political rights of non-citizens.
The occasion was the proposed admission of the Oregon Territory to the
Union under a constitution written by white Oregonians at a convention in
Salem, Oregon, in 1857. Bingham strenuously objected to two distinct
provisions of the draft constitution, and both objections were informed by
his view of the national nature of citizenship. The first provision permitted
white immigrants who were not naturalized citizens to take up residence in
the new state and exercise full voting rights; the second proclaimed it
illegal for ―free Negroes or mulattoes‖ to enter or remain within the state at
any time.198 Bingham regarded both as unconstitutional, one because it
was too inclusive and the other because it was too exclusive.
Bingham sets the stage of his two objections with a defense of birthright
citizenship that directly addresses the Schuck and Smith notion of
―ascription‖ as a remnant of medieval subjection:
Who are the citizens of the United States? Sir, they are those, and those
only, who owe allegiance to the Government of the United States; not
the base allegiance imposed upon the Saxon by the Conqueror, which
required him to meditate in solitude and darkness at the sound of the
curfew; but the allegiance which requires the citizen not only to obey,
but to support and defend, if need be with his life, the Constitution of his
country. All free persons born and domiciled within the jurisdiction of

197. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
198. This language of course became legally inoperative upon the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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the United States, are citizens of the United States from birth; all aliens
become citizens of the United States only by act of naturalization . . . .199

Of extending the vote to aliens, even those who had entered the
naturalization process, Bingham said,
The Constitution very clearly imports that only persons born here or
naturalized by law are citizens of the United States . . . . [C]itizens of the
United States are the free inhabitants, born and domiciled with in the
United states, or naturalized under the laws thereof, and that these alone
are citizens, and when resident within the several States, constitute the
body politic . . . .200

As for the exclusion of ―free Negroes and mulattoes,‖ Bingham said,
the persons thus excluded from the State by this section of the Oregon
constitution, are citizens by birth of the several States, and therefore are
citizens of the United States, and as such are entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .
....
All free persons, then, born and domiciled in any State of the Union, are
citizens of the United States . . . .
....
It is, sir, the public law of the civilized world, that every free man is
entitled to live in the land of his birth.201

In short, Bingham‘s theory of citizenship was a specifically republican
one, drawing on the egalitarian ideology of nineteenth century liberalism
and specifically distinguishing itself from the medieval ascriptive concept
of subjection. It was a definition that insisted on a sharp distinction
between the rights of aliens and those of citizens; and it was a definition
that insisted the only prerequisite for ―natural born‖ citizenship was legal
freedom at birth. The definition specifically rejected the idea that
citizenship could be further limited by ―conventional‖ restrictions on
―political rights‖ such as the right to vote or hold office.
The paramount theory of national citizenship by right of birth, in fact,
was by 1866 an important part of the legal as well as the intellectual
background of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of all the sources omitted by
those favoring a restrictive reading of the Citizenship Clause, none is quite
so adverse to their position as that of the opinion by Edward Bates,
Lincoln‘s Attorney General, on the citizenship of free black sailors engaged
199. John A. Bingham, The Constitution of the United States and the Proslavery
Provisions of the 1857 Oregon Constitution (1859), reprinted in TENBROEK, supra note 188,
at 320, 327 (emphasis added). The speech is being made after Dred Scott but well before
the Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment.
200. Id. at 330.
201. Id. at 336–41.
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in the coasting trade.202 That opinion, rendered in 1862, represented the
legal position of the United States at the time of the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment; it is hard to argue that it is not a salient part of the
legal background. In the opinion, Bates responded to a request from
Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase for an answer to a practical question:
―Are colored men citizens of the United States, and therefore competent to
command American vessels?‖203
Bates drew on the theories of Spooner and Tiffany to answer that
citizenship was the property of all persons born in the United States:
As far as I know, Mr. Secretary, you and I have no better title to the
citizenship which we enjoy than ―the accident of birth‖—the fact that
we happened to be born in the United States. And our Constitution, in
speaking of natural-born citizens, uses no affirmative language to make
them such, but only recognizes and reaffirms the universal principle,
common to all nations, and as old as political society, that the people
born in a country do constitute the nation, and, as individuals, are natural
members of the body politic.
If this be a true principle, and I do not doubt it, it follows that every
person born in the country is, at the moment of birth, prima facie a
citizen; and he who would deny it must take upon himself the burden of
proving some great disfranchisement strong enough to override the
―natural born‖ right as recognized by the Constitution in terms the most
simple and comprehensive, and without any reference to race or color, or
any other accidental circumstance.204

Bates admitted only one established exception to this rule: ―the small
and admitted class of the natural born composed of the children of foreign
ministers and the like.‖205 As for slaves, he explicitly refused to endorse
the generally understood rule, derived from Dred Scott, that children of
slaves were not citizens, ―because it is not within the scope of your
inquiry.‖206 In addition, he was at pains to make clear a second point
relevant to the current inquiry: that a child‘s citizenship is not created by
the legal status of his or her parents. ―It is an error to suppose that
citizenship is ever hereditary. It never ‗passes by descent.‘ It is as original
in the child as it was in his parents. It is always either born with him or
given to him directly by law.‖207

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Citizenship, 10 OP. ATT‘Y. GEN. 382 (1862).
Id. at 383 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 399.
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Bates turned to the issue of ―ascription‖ vs. ―consent‖ by referring to a
previous opinion, by former Attorney General William Wirt, that ―free
persons of color‖ residing in Virginia were not citizens of the United
States.208 Wirt‘s opinion had in part rested on the proposition that ―[t]he
allegiance which the free man of color owes to the State of Virginia is no
evidence of citizenship, for he owes it not in consequence of an oath of
allegiance.‖209 Bates wrote,
This proposition surprises me; perhaps I do not understand it. I did
verily believe that the oath of allegiance was not the cause but the
sequence of citizenship, given only as a solemn guarantee for the
performance of duties already incurred. But, if it be true that the oath of
allegiance must either create or precede citizenship, then it follows, of
necessity, that there can be no natural-born citizens, as the Constitution
affirms, because the child must be born before it can take the oath.210

A proper consideration of nineteenth century political thought—the
thought that formed the real background of the Framing of the Citizenship
Clause—furnishes strong evidence that the restrictive thesis, based on
Locke and other Enlightenment thinkers, is at best implausible. Readily
available evidence suggests that the thinkers who guided the Framing saw
birthright citizenship as the norm, with the sole exception being children of
diplomats—that they saw this as the state of affairs before the ratification
of the Amendment, which made explicit a fact they believed to be already
present in the Constitution. Readily available evidence suggests that this
view was not ambivalent, ill-thought-out, or crudely based on medieval
norms. It represented the fruit of the most advanced progressive social
thought available to Americans in the year 1866.
The act of the Framing was embedded in a history, and a set of ideas,
from which we pluck it at our peril. Those who would so isolate it from
context must furnish a justification for that choice—one that is
conspicuously missing from the ―originalist‖ scholarship on this subject.
V. BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
We have looked at the legislative debates surrounding the adoption of
the Clause. They do not support a restrictive reading of the Clause. We
have examined the legal background of the framing; the framing generation
gave almost no weight to the questions of ―consensualism,‖ and the polity‘s
right to exclude, that Schuck and Smith and others consider crucial.
208. Id. at 400 (1862) (discussing Rights of Free Virginia Negroes, 1 OP. ATT‘Y. GEN.
506, 509 (1821)).
209. Free Virginia Negros, supra note 208, at 508.
210. Citizenship, supra note 202, at 403.
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Two more arguments underlie the case for the restrictive reading. The
first is that circumstances have changed; that the Framers could not have
foreseen the unprecedented circumstances of America‘s immigration crisis.
The second is one of constitutional policy. One of the arguments against
birthright citizenship, remember, is that it is an ―anomaly,‖ contrary to the
spirit of the Constitution, and that it threatens democratic legitimacy by
forcing the polity to absorb the children of persons whom the majority has
made clear it does not want.
The first argument has two parts: first, that as in 1866 there was no such
legal category as ―illegal immigrant,‖211 the Framers could not have
intended the Clause to apply to their children. As a matter of historical
lexicography, this claim is hard to gainsay. But the lexicographical
argument is simple-minded; it is akin to arguing that the Air Force is
contrary to the Framers‘ intent because they only authorized an Army and a
Navy.
The more sophisticated argument would be that there was nothing like an
―illegal alien‖ at the time of the Framing. As a matter of historical analogy,
that argument rests on dubious reasoning. The debates about the Civil
Rights Act and the Citizenship Clause specifically address the situations of
two different groups who might be considered to share the core
characteristics of ―illegal aliens.‖
The central concerns of advocates of immigration restrictionists
prominently include, first, that ―illegal aliens‖ in their presence and their
conduct constitute a threat to the American system of law. They have
come here without permission (or have remained after temporary
permission has expired); they live here in defiance not only of entry
restrictions but in evasion of domestic laws.212 They constitute a
population that has deliberately chosen not to become part of the American
system and that thus threatens the very American idea of assimilation.
211. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
212. One common claim made about illegal aliens is that they ―pay no taxes‖ and that
they consume taxpayer dollars by accessing ―welfare programs‖; in fact, most ―illegal‖
workers who remain here do so because they are working or their family members are
working to support them. See Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented
Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1,
1–8 (2006) (compiling several studies demonstrating the misguided nature of American
attitudes toward the financial cost of ―illegal‖ immigration). In addition, many of these
workers pay more taxes than comparable legal workers because they can never expect to
receive the income-tax refunds and Social Security benefits they are paying for. Id. As for
the generous ―welfare programs‖ that aliens access, I am still trying to figure out what they
are. The single exception I am aware of lies in combined private, state and federal programs
that provide reimbursement to hospital emergency rooms that must treat uninsured patients.
This is not an inconsiderable cost, but one that could arguably be better addressed by a
program of universal health care rather than by doing violence to the Constitution.
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But as noted above, two groups that featured in the debates actually give
us a very good gauge of what the Framers thought about these issues:
children of Chinese workers and children of Gypsies. The Chinese, who
had been present in large numbers in California and the West since the
California Gold Rush of 1849, were barred from naturalization under the
―white-only‖ terms of the Naturalization Act of 1790. Their presence in
the United States was ―legal‖ within the crude boundaries of antebellum
immigration law, but they were not eligible for citizenship no matter how
long or productive their residence in the United States. They were most
particularly ―subject to a foreign power‖ in that they remained subjects of
the Chinese Empire; they were resented and opposed as competition with
native-born citizens for laboring jobs in the goldfield and on the railroads;
and they were the subject of an explicit and pointed refusal by the polity to
grant its consent to their membership in the body politic.
Nonetheless, as noted above, the sponsors of the Fourteenth
Amendment, when asked in clear terms about this case, were unwavering
in their insistence that the Citizenship Clause was to cover their children.
As an example of the Framers‘ attitudes toward the children of those the
polity spurns, this flat certainty is powerfully suggestive. Restrictivereading proponents are harshly critical of the Supreme Court‘s 1898
decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark213 that American-born children
of Chinese immigrants are American citizens; but simply as a matter of
reading the ―intent‖ of the drafters, it seems unexceptionable.
The second example, of the Gypsies, is equally suggestive. Remember
Senator Cowan‘s description of these people as interlopers ―who recognize
no authority in [Pennsylvania‘s] government; who have a distinct,
independent government of their own—an imperium in imperio; who pay
no taxes; who never perform military service; who do nothing, in fact,
which becomes the citizen.‖214 The reference to Gypsy people in the
debates was far from random. Opponents of the Civil Rights Act and of the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment had fixed on the specter of Gypsy
citizenship in a way that eerily prefigures the contemporary Washington
practice of generating hypothetical disasters as ―talking points‖ in public
policy debates. The idea of ―the people called Gipsies[sic]‖ as a menace
was specifically evoked by Andrew Johnson in his message vetoing the
Civil Rights Act.215
213. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
214. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2890–91 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan).
215. Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Civil Rights Bill (Mar. 27, 1866), in THE POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 74,
74–78 (Edward McPherson ed., Negro Universities Press 1969) (1875).
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It is thus ahistorical to suggest that the Framers did not foresee the legal
and social characteristics of what we today call ―illegal‖ or
―undocumented‖ immigrants. They did; and they rather categorically
stated that these characteristics—ineligibility for citizenship,
unacceptability as members of the body politic, isolation from American
culture and systematic evasion of American law—would not constitute
exceptions to the Amendment‘s grant of birthright citizenship.
The second argument is one of scale. Writing thirty years ago, Schuck
and Smith note that estimates of illegal immigration range between 3 and
6.5 million as of 1980. ―This reality and the fears that it has generated
concerning its economic and social effects have transformed political
discourse about American immigration policy in ways that neither
[nineteenth-century courts] nor the Reconstruction Framers of the
Citizenship Clause could have anticipated.‖216 The absolute number of
―illegal‖ aliens present in the United States today is obviously greater. Five
years ago, a sophisticated estimate placed the number at 10.3 million.217 As
noted above, the presence of these immigrants (more than half of whom
come from Mexico218) constitutes a profound challenge to existing
American institutions and norms, and has generated and continues to
generate social change across the country.
That argument is strongly echoed today by writers such as Charles
Wood, who writes,
The very ambiguity of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the
census and birthright citizenship issues stems in large part from the fact
that, at the time the Amendment was drafted in 1866, there was no such
person as an illegal alien. Today, however, the number of illegal aliens
is conservatively estimated at five million . . . .219

Each generation imagines that its problems are different from those of all
who have come before. We have no idea what America will look like in
2110; but we do know that the United States of 1866 survived to become
the United States of 2010. It seems, then, that the changes they faced were
less wrenching than those we face. They were guaranteed a happy ending;
it is right there in the history textbook.
But that is a cast of mind, not a historical conclusion. America in 1866
was a nation as profoundly transformed by immigration as it is in 2010.

216. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 93.
217. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., REPORT: ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION 1, 4 (March 21, 2005),
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf.
218. Id. at 2.
219. Wood, supra note 24, at 468–69.
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Issues of language, culture, religion, social mores and other aspects of the
American identity were as salient then as they were now. We would be
making a profound historical error to imagine that the generation that
framed the Clause was unaware that migration was a transformative and
often destabilizing force in American society.
Simply as one fact, consider that during the Civil War years alone, the
United States population increased by four million people—most them
immigrants. That represented eleven percent of the population in 1866,
when the Fourteenth Amendment debate took place.220 Foreign-born
soldiers accounted for 20 percent of the Union Army‘s total strength during
the war221—an edge in numbers that, coupled with the enlistment of
thousands of native-born black soldiers, gave the Union the edge of victory.
The explosion in foreign-born Americans was, however, not a wartime
phenomenon: In 1850, the percentage of the U.S. population that was
foreign born was 9.7 percent. By 1860, it was 13.2 percent, even before the
influx noted above.222 How does that compare with our situation today?
The most recent census estimate places it at 12.4 percent.223 In other
words, Americans in 1866, particularly those in the North, were at least as
aware of immigration as we are today, when the issue is central to the
domestic policy debate.
Further, the ongoing debate about assimilation of new immigrant
populations—along with persistent fears that whichever group is entering
the U.S. most recently brings with it new and insoluble differences of
language, culture and loyalty—is quite literally as old as the Republic. The
very first ―national security‖ crisis in the American Republic—the ―Quasi
War‖ with France—sparked a panic that French immigrants were
subversive, disloyal, and unassimilable.224 Similar strains of nativism
resounded through the national debate from that moment until the end of
the Civil War.

220. EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 20.
221. Id.
222. Epps, Don‘ts and Dos, supra note 33, at 443 (citing Campbell J. Gibson & Emily
Lennon, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States:
1850–1990, tbl. 13 (Population Div., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Working Paper No. 29,
1999),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab13.html).
223. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION BY SEX, AGE, NATIVITY, AND U.S.
CITIZENSHIP STATUS: 2008 tbl. 1.1, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/foreign/cps2008/tab1-2008.pdf.
224. See generally JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM‘S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND
SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956) (providing examples of political
reactions of figures such as President Adams to the French in and around the summer of
1798).
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Much of the formation of the infant Republican Party consisted of an
attempt to marry the anti-slavery and anti-immigrant sentiments of much of
the Midwestern and New England population with the free-labor loyalties
of the immigrants themselves. Many important figures in the anti-slavery
movement and the Republican Party were themselves immigrants, and a
number of them played an important role in the intellectual ferment that
produced the Fourteenth Amendment. Francis Lieber, the German-born
social scientist, was the first figure publicly to suggest that the Constitution
must be remodeled at the end of the Civil War, and his proposed
amendments bear a distinct paternal resemblance to the eventual result.225
Carl Schurz, a confidant of Lincoln, was a native of Germany and a key
figure in refuting the claims of American nativists that the influx of
European immigrants in the 1840s and 1850s should be combated by legal
restrictions. His official report from the defeated South was an important
part of setting the stage for the Fourteenth Amendment.226 Robert Dale
Owen, the influential radical who served in Congress and was a member of
Lincoln‘s wartime American Freedmens Inquiry Commission, was a
naturalized citizen; he was the author, among other things, of the first draft
of what emerged from the Joint Committee on Reconstruction as the
―omnibus amendment‖ that became the Fourteenth Amendment. 227 Senator
John Conness, whose discussion of the citizenship of American-born
children of Chinese immigrants is a key part of the record, was himself an
immigrant from Ireland.228
In short, the idea that the Framers lived in a simpler world, that they
could not have intended their handiwork to apply to a chaotic, multicultural
America, does not pass the most superficial historical scrutiny.

225. FRANCIS LIEBER, AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION SUBMITTED TO THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1864) (suggesting that there be amendments to
the Constitution that make every native of the United States entitled to the full protection of
the law).
226. See EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 34–38 (outlining how Schurz was
selected to write the report); HANS L. TREFOUSSE, CARL SCHURZ: A BIOGRAPHY 153–61,
182 (1982) (detailing the reaction to Schurz‘s report).
227. See EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 184–85 (describing a meeting
between Owen and Thaddeus Stevens to discuss what was to become the Fourteenth
Amendment); RICHARD WILLIAM LEOPOLD, ROBERT DALE OWEN: A BIOGRAPHY 360–69
(1940) (describing Owen‘s work with the American Freedmen‘s Inquiry Commission and
providing the text of Owen‘s draft amendment).
228. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress:
Conness, John,
CONGRESS.GOV
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=c000695, (last
visited Oct. 20, 2010).
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CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY AND BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP
The final argument, as noted above, is one of constitutional policy. Is it
a bad idea to extend birthright citizenship to all children born in the United
States? Is it anomalous, undemocratic, or in some other way not in keeping
with the underlying ideas of the Constitution? Does it portend the
swamping or destruction of the American identity under a wave of alien
invaders?
As I (and Schuck and Smith) have said, it may in fact have been
anomalous to have a birthright rule in the republic set up by the
Constitution of 1787. Much of the social theory we have absorbed to
understand that document—an eighteenth century confederation of smaller,
quasi-sovereign, elite-dominated ―Atlantic republics‖—rebels at the idea of
uncritical inclusiveness, whether for purposes of citizenship, voting, or the
exercise of basic civil rights.
But just as ―we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are
expounding,‖229 we must also never forget that the Fourteenth Amendment
is not the Fourteenth Reaffirmation. It is an amendment we are construing,
one written by different Framers with nineteenth, not eighteenth, century
views. They were willing to undertake the desperate political struggle
required for an amendment because they perceived that the original
Constitution had failed catastrophically.
That catastrophic failure,
moreover, was directly related to the issue of inclusion and exclusion in the
body politic. The split between the sections was a dispute over the proper
place in the national life of a population of persons of African descent.
One side gradually came to believe that they were, and always had been,
citizens within the correct meaning of the Constitution; the other insisted
that they were never and could never be citizens, that they were a
permanently inferior caste whose proper role was to serve the
Constitution‘s true beneficiaries. The direct and immediate purpose of the
Citizenship Clause was to take the latter doctrine out of American law,
where it had been written by Chief Justice Taney in Scott v. Sandford.
One of the most striking things about contemporary interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment is its resolute unwillingness to confront the
Amendment as a textual and conceptual whole. The standard method of
interpretation, which a number of proponents of a restrictive reading of the
Clause employ, is to disaggregate the Amendment, ignore all sections but
the first, and then consider each phrase separately. It is as if the Framers
are thought to have enacted a grocery list, randomly including milk, eggs,

229. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis added).
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flour, sugar, butter, baking powder, and vanilla flavoring. We could take
each ingredient, research its significance in Western history, and then
conclude that they have been jammed together randomly. But wouldn‘t it
make more sense to consider it as a recipe for, say, a cake, in which each
ingredient is to contribute something to the others?
Elsewhere I have suggested that the aim of the Amendment—deducible
from its text and from the circumstances of its adoption—was to replace
the loose confederation of exclusive republics with a nation that would
finally redeem the promise of James Madison‘s decidedly un-Atlantic idea
of an ―extended republic,‖230 comprehending a diversity of interests and
passions, to create a society in which popular participation and the rights of
political minorities would be protected from majoritarian oppression.
The 1787 Constitution, in the view of the Amendment‘s Framers, had
signally failed to realize the advantages Madison foresaw. Instead, it had
allowed the Southern states to create quasi-sovereign dictatorships in which
Madison‘s nightmare231 came true: ―Men of factious tempers, of local
prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by
other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interest of the
people.‖232 As the anti-slavery Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment saw
it, the ―lords of the lash‖ had (with the connivance of the federal
government) made themselves oligarchs and used their influence on the
nation to subject the free population to the designs and ambitions of the
Slave Power.233
A major tool of the Slave Power had been state control over citizenship,
and insistence that human equality had no role to play in American life.
Economic, social and political life depended upon the existence of a large,
permanently subordinated class of non-citizens who could be exploited to
produce wealth. The Citizenship Clause took this option away not only
from the local elites but from the nation as a whole. From its enactment
forward, the United States would be what the German American
immigrants‘ rights advocate Carl Schurz called ―the republic of equal
rights, where the title of manhood is the title to citizenship.‖234
Citizenship was to be extended to all—not out of grace, but as a means
of protecting the nation from those who would reinvent the Slave Power.
Only radical civic equality could prevent the re-emergence of local
230. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
231. With apologies to Professor Peter Shane, who used this phrase, equally aptly, to
describe the current executive branch. See PETER M. SHANE, MADISON‘S NIGHTMARE: HOW
EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009).
232. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
233. EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 10.
234. Id. at 35.
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oligarchy and systems of exploitation. Walt Whitman, who thought as
deeply as any American about the causes and impact of the Civil War,
wrote in its aftermath that ―[o]f all dangers to a nation, as things exist in
our day, there can be no greater one than having certain portions of the
people set off from the rest by a line drawn—they not privileged as others,
but degraded, humiliated, made of no account.‖235
And if that view is valid, there is an alarming irony in the proposition
that the United States should alter its constitutional system to create a large
internal population of native-born non-citizens, a hereditary subordinate
caste of persons who are subjected to American law but do not belong to
American society. To one with a historical memory, the new proposed
status, supposedly implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment, looks very much
like an old status that was supposedly cured by the Thirteenth Amendment.
There is a huge difference between a Republic in which all those born or
naturalized are equal, and one in which all animals are equal but some are
less equal than others. The idea of legalized inequality has a logic that
history forbids us to deny; it leads toward forced labor, deportation, and
concentration camps.236
To make legal equality, or even existence, dependent on blood has a
chilling history worldwide. To the extent that other countries follow the jus
sanguinis rule today, it can‘t be said that their immigration policies are a
thumping success either. As Professor Shachar notes, ―strict interpretation
of jus sanguinis perpetuates the exclusion of certain segments of the
permanent population of a given polity by denying them full access to the
rights and benefits of citizenship, based on the criterion of ancestry that
they can neither choose nor change.‖237 According to Shachar, ―under such
conditions, jus sanguinis constitutes a deeply objectionable system of
legalized ascriptive hierarchy.‖238
In the specific context of American history, if the children of ―illegal
aliens‖ are ―illegal‖ themselves, then we have taken a giant step toward
recreating slavery in all but name. If citizenship is the hereditary gift of the
nation rather than the inheritance of its people, we are drifting back toward
the discredited doctrine of Dred Scott. And if state governments arrogate

235. WALT WHITMAN, Democratic Vistas, in COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE
929, 949 (Justin Kaplan ed., Library of America 1982).
236. That logic is playing itself out at a remarkable speech in the current debate. See
Associated Press, Candidate Calls for ‗Camps‘ for Illegal Immigrants, NAPLESNEWS.COM
(Aug. 12, 2010) http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2010/aug/12/marg-baker-illegalimmigrants-camps/ (reporting that a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives
wants to house illegal immigrants in ―camps‖ until they can be deported).
237. SHACHAR, supra note 27, at 121.
238. Id.
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to themselves the power to decide which groups within their borders
―merit‖ citizenship, the central promise of the Amendment—paramount
national citizenship—has been eviscerated.
The idea that these radical egalitarians ―intended‖ to allow creation of a
new hereditary and subordinate caste of laborers should, I think, stir the
profoundest skepticism. That it is being taken seriously by prominent
judges and academics is yet another melancholy illustration of Samuel
Johnson‘s saying that ―reason by degrees submits to absurdity, as the eye is
in time accommodated to darkness.‖239 Like courtiers‘ praise for the
emperor‘s new clothes, the repeated claims to discern an obscure intent in
clear language can create confusion; as only the good could see the nonexistent raiment, allegedly only the truly learned can see the invisible
―intent‖ in the Clause.
It should be the goal of scholarship to dispel, not deepen, conceptual
darkness. The work of many ―originalist‖ scholars has added significantly
to our understanding of the Constitution‘s meaning and history. One need
not accept all the conclusions of an ―originalist‖ inquiry to feel grateful for
the care and thoroughness with which it has been performed, and for the
ideas and insights it has generated. But not all originalism is careful. The
rhetoric of ―clear intent‖ may make it easy to substitute anachronistic,
results-oriented ideas for a systematic interpretation of text, structure, and
history—which are required of all constitutional scholars of any school. A
dubious claim of ―clear intent‖ may be followed by a claim that this
―discovery‖ closes down the contemporary work of interpretation. This
rhetorical move disguises the fact that a contemporary interpretation is
being imposed on constitutional text as surely as it might be by any radical
―non-interpretivist.‖
That the techniques and discourse of originalism can be misused to reach
such a perverse result should give us some impetus to refine those
techniques and sharpen that discourse.

239. SAMUEL JOHNSON, The Rambler No. 8, in SELECTED POETRY AND PROSE 159, 161
(Frank Brady & W. K. Wimsatt, eds., University of California Press, 1977).

